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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF John Robert Oreskovich for 
the Master of Arts in History presented November 8, 1983. 
Title: American-Yugoslav Relations, 1941-1946. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
This thesis deals with the diplomatic relations 
between Yugoslavia and the United States through the 
Second World War and the first few months following the 
end of the War. It follows in chronological order the 
events influencing American-Yugoslav relations. Emphasis 
is placed on the development of Yugoslav internal events 
and their political implications. 
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The United States, after some initial enthusiasm for 
Yugoslavia, remained on the periphery of Yugoslav affairs, 
but stayed in diplomatic contact with the Yugoslav govern-
ment. The American ability to remain outside of Yugoslav 
events lessened as the war progressed. The Partisan move-
ment and its leader, Tito, changed the political situation 
within Yugoslavia. This fact created a different set of 
values in American dealings with Yugoslavia and eventually 
led to the American recognition of a totally new type of 
government in Yugoslavia. 
Diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Yugoslavia throughout the war were kept on a formal basis. 
The United States kept its sight on what it deemed to be 
its global responsibilities and needs and was sympathetic, 
but not very helpful, to the Yugoslavs. America had main-
tained relations with Yugoslavia for about twenty years 
when the war broke out, but relations--both political and 
economic--were not important between the two nations. 
Neither country knew much about the other and, though the 
war would change this parochial attitude to some degree, 
relations with Yugoslavia remained at best of secondary 
importance for the United States, as they were for Yugo-
slavia. 
The American presence in Yugoslavia during the war 
was minimal, with only a handful of mostly military per-
sonnel taking part. Further~ore, until quite late in the 
3 
conflict, the American mission to the country subordinated 
itself to the British. The American policy was to keep out 
of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav affairs as much as possible. 
The changing political realities in Yugoslavia finally 
brought more American attention there, but it remained a 
minor part of America's greater international goals. 
The Tito movement caused consternation and study by 
the American government. The United States remained in 
contact with the Yugoslav monarchy to a much greater de-
gree than the British, for example, and came only slowly 
to accept Tito. American officials wished for the Yugo-
slavs to enjoy the freedom of Western democracies, but 
would learn of the repressive actions of Tito and recognize 
his government in any case. This recognition of Tito was 
mad~ after America was assured that he would recognize 
prior American and international claims against the pre-
vious Yugoslav governments. America, to the end, wished 
to husband her resources and give as few to Yugoslavia as 
possible, especially after the face of the Tito regime 
became more familiar. 
The material for this thesis came from official 
American diplomatic papers, predominantly Foreign Relations 
of the United States Diplomatic Papers. Where possible, 
autobiographies were used, but for the most part they con-
centrated to only a minor degree, if at all, on American-
Yugoslav relations. Periodicals were used, with the 
greatest help coming from The New York Times. Secondary 
literature was used, but in most instances was of less 
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The United States was the first major power to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia (then 
called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). It did 
so on February 6, 1919. No break in these relations was to 
occur, although American diplomatic representatives left the 
country after Yugoslavia's defeat in April 1941. The United 
States had maintained an embassy at the Yugoslav capitol 
at Belgrade. There also was an American consulate located 
in Zagreb. The Yugoslavs maintained an embassy in 
Washington, D.C. and several other offices in areas of 
large, Yugoslav-American populations. These cities included 
Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland. Yugoslavia also 
maintained an information and tourist office in New York. 
Although the American government maintained proper 
relations with the Yugoslav government, it played an 
insignificant role in matters pertaining to Yugoslavia. The 
most important political action, after recognition, was 
performed in Congress. This, of course, was the immigration 
laws passed in 1921 and 1924. These laws greatly restricted 
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immigration from Yugoslavia and basically halted the most 
important contract between the two countries--the emigration 
of Yugoslavs to the United States. These laws, coupled with 
American isolationist feelings and the depression, greatly 
limited American-Yugoslav interaction. 
There was, however, commerce carried on between the two 
nations throughout the inter-war period. The United States 
was one of Yugoslavia's major trading partners. It ranked 
sixth in volume and seventh in value in Yugoslavia's trade 
relations. The United States consumed 6.02% of all Yugoslav 
exports, which, for the most part, consisted of raw 
materials. 
The most important American imports were copper, hops, 
haricot beans, chrome ore and cement. America, in turn, was 
1 
responsible for 5.07% of Yugoslav imports. The United 
States sent Yugoslavia raw cotton, vehicles, machinery and 
instruments, leather, electrical equipment, and crude naptha 
(petroleum). This interaction was much more important to 
Yugoslavia than to the United States.* It showed how 
* Yugoslavia's largest and by far most important trading 
partner during the period was Germany. Germany was 
responsible for 35.94% of Yugoslav exports and for 32.52% 
of Yugoslavia's imports. The trade relationship with 
Germany, as it was with all of Yugoslavia's trading 
partners was that of a supplier of foodstuffs and raw 
materials which Yugoslavia would exchange for finished 
goods. Germany was followed in importance by 
Czechoslovakia (10.65% imports and 7.89% exports), Italy 
(8.94% imports and 6.42% exports) Great Britain (8.67% 
imports and 9.61% exports) and Austria (6.88% imports and 
6.06% exports.)2 
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Yugoslavia was receiving for the most part finished goods 
and exporting lower value raw materials--a classic example 
of trade from a less developed country to a more advanced 
one. 
Yugoslavia's trade was largely conducted with Germany 
and her future territories and Italy, Germany's most 
important ally after 1936. This fact plus Yugoslavia's 
geographic isolation from the United States left America 
with very little economic leverage when dealing with 
Yugoslavia. 
As previously stated, one of the main points of contact 
between the United States and Yugoslavia had been the influx 
of immigrants to the United States. However, immigration 
from Yugoslav areas was much smaller and developed later 
than from northern and western Europe. Until the end of the 
19th century, this immigration had been a trickle and never 
reached the size and importance of the Irish, for example. 
In many cases, people of Yugoslav extraction were not even 
recognized by their proper nationalities. Examples abound 
of Yugoslavs being listed as Austrians, Hungarians, and 
Italians. This is understandable since the greatest influx 
of Yugoslav peoples occurred before a Yugoslav state or 
nationality existed and before anyone identified themselves 
as Yugoslav. 
Another problem of recognition for Yugoslav 
4 
contributions in America was the changing of surnames. For 
example, it was a Croatian named Antonije Lutit, born in 
3 
Split , who was the geologist who discovered ore in Texas. 
His name is known as Anthony F. Lucas, and his ancestry is 
for the most part unknown. This, of course, applies to most 
Slavic people whose names were "strange" and who lived under 
foreign domination. By 1940, it was estimated that there 
were 1,000,000 Yugoslavs in the United States, including 
both native and foreign born (500,000 Croatians, 300,000 
4 
Slovenes, and 200,000 Serbs). 
The influence of these 1,000,000 people within the 
United States was scant. They represented less than 1% of 
the total population, and many were not citizens, nor could 
they speak English. Economically, they were poor and worked 
in the most menial and poorly-paid positions. They tended 
to be miners, farm laborers, and steelworkers and for the 
most part lived tucked away in their own non-English 
speaking portions of the community out of sight and out of 
the way. The greatest numbers of Yugoslavs lived near 
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, New Orleans, the mining 
areas of Montana, and various fishing communities such as 
San Pedro, California and Astoria, Oregon. 
There were, of course, exceptions to this status, but 
even here they received far less credit than they deserved. 
For example, Nikola Tesla, a Serb born in Lika, Croatia, was 
5 
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the inventor of alternating current and the radio among 
his many contributions to electrical engineering. He did 
the vast majority of his work in the United States, and its 
universal importance cannot be disclaimed. Yet few people 
have even heard of him. He, like his fellow Yugoslav 
immigrants, was far too busy working to enter the mainstream 
of American life. 
The lone shining light in America before the Second 
World War was Louis Adamic. Adamic was born in Laibach, 
Austria (today Ljubljana, Slovenia). He immigrated to the 
United States at the age of fourteen, where he began to work 
and study in the publishing industry. He became a writer 
and had many articles and books published and distributed 
throughout the United States. His most famous work was the 
book Native's Return, published in New York in 1934. This 
book described the life of the peasant and his problems 
under the dictatorship in Yugoslavia. It gave America a 
glimpse of land little known and made the author famous. 
Adamic was very active throughout the United States 
trying to help the immigrant to assimilate, but his greatest 
influence came during World War II. He would be invited to 
the White House where he had dinner with President Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Churchill. In the final stages of the 
war, he worked hard for the recognition of Tito and his 
6 
Communists.* 
This lack of knowledge by the American public of 
Yugoslavia and her people was in sharp contrast to American 
knowledge of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Although the 
Yugoslavs had set up a committee in London during the First 
World War like the others and had become independent at the 
same time, they enjoyed far less prestige. Yugoslavia had 
no one of the national reknown of Poland's Ignace Jan 
Paderewski or Czecholsovakia's Thomas Masaryk and Edward 
Benes. These men brought a recognition and status to their 
countries that the nameless members of the Serbian Army, 
however legendary their valor, could not bring for the 
future state of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not to have such 
a man until after the Second World War. 
American officials and the public knew even less about 
the internal political situation in Yugoslavia in 1940 
* Adamic, who died an apparent suicide at Riegelsville, New 
Jersey, on September 4, 1951, was a prolific writer. He 
started his career by translating stories from Slovenian, 
Croatian, and Serbian into English. He wrote many books, 
two of which have already been mentioned. The complete 
list includes: Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in 
America (published 1931); Laughing in the Jungle (1932, 
an autobiographical volume); Grandsons (published 1935) 
and Cradle of Life (published 1936), both of which dealt 
with immigrant life; ~ America, 1928-1938 (published 
1938) and From Many Lands (published 1940), both of which 
were additional autobiographical volumes; Two-Way Passage· 
(published 1941), which was a study of America's future 
role in Europe and was the reason he was invited to the 
White House. His final volume, published after his 
death, was The Eagle and the Roots (published 1952), a 
pseudo-biography of Tito. 
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than they did about the hardy Yugoslav immigrant now working 
diligently in American industry. Yugoslavia was a Balkan 
country, and, as such, it carried a stigma for Americans. 
The Balkan countries seemed to be places where wars were 
started and politics made little if any sense to the 
outsider. This American understanding of Yugoslavia was 
limited and its politics considered far too troublesome to 
create a field of study in the United States. It would take 
a crash course in relations between the two countries during 
the War before the United States would begin to understand 
Yugoslavia. 
The major concern for anyone who wished to understand 
internal Yugoslav politics was the ethnic issue. The ethnic 
issue was dominated by a lack of understanding between 
Yugoslavia's two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and the 
Croats. The Serbs, who were of the Orthodox faith, were 51% 
of the population and dominated Yugoslavia. The Croats, who 
were Roman Catholic, were 31% of the population and resented 
Serbian domination. 
Serbia (including Montenegro) was the only portion of 
Yugoslavia to have been independent before the First World 
War, and naturally the Serbs considered themselves the 
nucleus for an expanded Serbian/Yugoslav state. The Croats, 
on the other hand, had not been truly independent since 
1102. The Croats also had been part of the Austrian Empire, 
8 
against whom the Serbs had just completed a devastating war. 
Although these two peoples spoke virtually the same language 
and had much the same cultural-historical heritage, they did 
not share a common religion. In Yugoslavia, one was most 
commonly identified by his religion, and this fact colored 
all decisions. 
Distrust of Catholicism, tied up in their minds 
with the hereditary enemies Austria, Hungary and 
Italy, is deeply rooted in the Serbs. Moreover, the 
Orthodox Church, which normally plays little part 
in politics but comes to the front when the nation 
is in danger, commands profound loyalty.6 
It must be added that the Croats felt no less attached 
to the Catholic church, which they believed nurtured their 
cultural identity. The feelings of linguistic togetherness 
could never make up or even help to cover the prejudices of 
the two groups for each other's religion. 
The two peoples also differed on their views on 
establishing the new country. The Croats wished Yugoslavia 
to be a federal state, while the Serbs sought and gained a 
centralized and Serb-dominated administration. 
Demands to become 'Yugoslav' were felt by Croats as 
demands that they should throw over their whole 
historial heritage and national consciousness, 
cease to be Croats and become Serbs, citizens of a 
centralized Serbian State.7 
The Serbs dominated virtually all phases of the 
Yugoslav government. The Serbs, proud of their military 
9 
tradition, dominated the military. "Of the 105 generals in 
active service in 1938, 161 were Serbs, 2 were Croats*, and 
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2 were Slovenes." Even in Croatia itself, the Serbs 
dominated the civil service. The Croats began to resent the 
Serb-dominated police. 
The gendarmerie, which was composed almost 
exclusively of Serbs, was increased in number and 
often behaved not only tactlessly but cruelly. 
Croatian peasants were terrorized and robbed.9 
The politics and the political parties, as might be 
expected, reflected this situation. Only one political 
party in Yugoslavia was popular in all parts of the country. 
This was the Communist party, which was outlawed in August 
of ~921, even after finishing a strong third in the national 
elections of 1920. The Communists were 
the only major party whose appeal transcended 
ethnic and regional particularism. They alone 
affirmed the existence of a Yugoslav nation at a 
time when official nomenclature was still committed 
to the distinctiveness of its Serbian, Croatian, 
and Slovene parts.10 
The party would not die, but would not surface publicly 
again until Yugoslavia was overrun and subjected to a brutal 
occupation. 
* 
The political differences surfaced almost immediately 
The German Army could claim as many generals of Croatian 
descent, including Commander-in-Chief of the German Army 
Walter von Brauchitsch and General Lothar Rendulic. 
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in the new country. After the initial elections, the Croats 
felt powerless and the "Yugoslav" constitution was ratified 
without Croation participation. The constitution 
emerged as a predominantly Serbian document, 
democratic in the sense that it provided for a 
single chamber elected by manhood suffrage and 
guaranteed ministerial responsibility but strongly 
centralist in character.11 
The Serbs "did not trust the Croats and treated them as 
12 
a potentially hostile people" , and therefore all phases of 
the Yugoslav government were kept under the firm control of 
the Serbs. The Constitution was ratified in 1921, .but it 
was not until 1925 that the Croats sent their first 
representatives to the national assembly ("~kupltina"). The 
Croats remained as participants for only a year and then 
again refused to participate. 
The Croats were led by Stjepan Radie, who was the head 
of the Croatian Peasant Party. The Croatian Peasant Party 
was for years the sole political voice of the Croatians in 
Yugoslavia. It had originally stood for political reform and 
economic emancipation of the peasant masses. However, with 
its total domination of Croatian politics, it reflected the 
entire political spectrum. The Party was held together by 
its struggle against the Serbs.* The main role of the party 
* For a brief explanation of the Croatian Peasant Party, 
see Hugh Setan-Watsan's Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 
1918-1941, pp 227-230. 
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was to better the Croatian position within Yugoslavia. It 
dealt with several Serbian parties and was considered by the 
Serbs as an obstructionist force, detailing matters of 
importance to the Yugoslav state. 
The politics became so heated between the Croats and 
the Serbs that on June 20, 1928, a Serbian politician shot 
/ v ~ 
Radie and four other Croatian deputies in the "Skupstina." 
Radi~'s death led to the implementation of a Yugoslav 
dictatorship in 1929. The country was now run by King 
Alexander, who tried to avert any further conflicts. The 
King himself was a Serb and therefore a strong supporter 
of the status quo (i.e., Serbian domination of Yugoslav 
affairs). 
The announcement of the dictatorship caused many Croats 
to lose hope in the Yugoslav concept. Led by Dr. Ante 
Pavelic, they formed a separatist movement called the 
~ v .,, ""' 
"Ustasa,"*· The Ustasa was formed from the right of the 
Croatian political movement and took members away from the 
Croatian Peasant Party. It would rule the Axis-dominated 
(puppet) state of Croatia during the war. It was interested 
in obtaining Croat independence by any means, and would work 
with anyone who would further this goal. Its main support 
* "ustaaa", plural "Usta~e" or "Usterse Pokret" (U;ta~e 
movement). Refers to the Croatian separatists or 
Fascists. Literally translated, "U~ta~e" means insurgent 
or rebel. Under Axis tutelage, the Ustase would rule the 
"Independent State of Croatia" during World War II. 
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outside the country came from Italy and Hungary, two nations 
which covered large portions of Yugoslav territory. The 
Usta~a was responsible in 1934 for the assassination of King 
Alexander during his state visit to France. 
The Yugoslav government now passed to the control of 
Prince Paul, who was named regent until the Crown Prince was 
old enough to rule. Prince Paul would remain Head of State 
until he was overthrown by a coup d'etat in late March 1941. 
He was a Serb, but not considered to be as dedicated to the 
Serb cause as the Late King was. His ascendancy was looked 
upon with hope by the Croatian population. However, after 
calling new elections, Yugoslav politics again settled into 
the pattern of Serb domination and Croat passivity. 
Yugoslavia was of course required to maintain foreign 
relations during this period. The main issue for Yugoslavia 
was to maintain her borders, and thus security was the major 
force in foreign affairs. The Yugoslavs were surrounded by 
nations seeking partitions of its territory. Italy, Hungary 
and Bulgaria were the main threats. To counter this, 
Yugoslavia "had pursued an apparently successful foreign 
policy of anchoring Yugoslav security in the complementary 
13 
Little Entente and French alliance systems." However, 
Yugoslav policy began to change as Europe headed toward war. 
I 
Milan Stojadinovic , Yugoslav Prime Minister from 1935 to 
1939, was the individual most responsible for this. He 
13 
slowly brought Yugoslav policy more in line with the aims of 
Germany and Italy. 
He realized that after the Munich Crises, Yugoslav 
security could not rest on its former pro-French bases. The 
Little Entente was dead. He also realized that Yugoslav 
trade was becoming more and more dominated by Germany. 
/ Stojadinovie had tried to counter this growing German trade 
monopoly by appealing to both Italy and Great Britain; 
however, he was unsuccessful. Great Britain was still 
caught up in her own economic problems, and Italy needed 
little of what Yugoslavia had to offer. The United States 
was too far away and too disinterested to create much 
interest from the Yugoslavs. Some benefits were gained by 
Yugolsavia during this time, but most came from Italy and 
Germany. v ~ The Italians had kept the Ustasa bottled up on 
Sardinia, and the Germans were paying top prices for 
Yugoslav exports. However, Yugoslavia had to give Italian 
·claims of preeminence in Albania leeway. 
In January of 1939, the Croatian Peasant Party, under 
its leader Dr. Vlado Matek, met with all Croatian political 
groups (excluding the Ustasa) in Zagreb. The Croats were 
again absent from Belgrade. Macek announced at this meeting 
that the Croats had not been given their rights and thus 
felt no commitments towards Yugoslav policy. He "concluded 
with the ominous 'hope' that the Croats would not be 
'forced' to resort to revolt and civil war in order to 
14 
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realize their due rights." This meeting was followed in 
February by the sacking of Stojadinovicand the imposition 
of a new government by Prince Paul. 
Prince Paul appointed Dragisa Cvetkovic~as the head of 
the government and Aleksandar Cincar-Markovic" as foreign 
minister. This government was given the task by Prince Paul 
of bringing the Croats back into the political flow of 
Yugoslav affairs. Paul saw internal stability both as a 
problem and as a necessity for his country. This new 
government quickly signed the "Sporazum" (Compromise) with 
Macek and the Croats. This returned the Croats to Belgrade 
and to complete participation in the government. Although 
the Sporazum brought the Croats back into the government, 
it did very little to actually unite the country. 
With the country at least superficially united, the 
Yugoslavs faced the task of determining their political 
future within Europe. Yugoslavia was, except in the South, 
now completely surrounded by Axis powers--which were, for 
the most part, unfriendly. Yugoslavia had also been witness 
to sweeping German victories in Poland and France. The 
Yugoslav government knew that its army, even if fully 
united (which it was not), had no chance against Germany. 
The Yugoslavs were now faced with a choice as to whether to 
join the Tripartite Pact or not. 
This crisis in Yugoslav foreign policy finally drew the 
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attention of the two remaining great Western powers, Great 
Britain and the United States. They worked together with 
Great Britain taking the lead, but the United States no less 
concerned, in trying to prevent Yugoslavia's signing of the 
Tripartite Pact. This was the beginning of American 
involvement in Yugoslavia (see Chapter II) during the Second 
World War. The United States would remain in contact with 
the Yugoslav government in varying degrees throughout the 
remainder of the War. 
American policy would develop first as an adjunct of 
the British and finally as a response to American needs. 
The United States was diplomatically active in Yugoslavia 
before the latter was overthrown. It would be less active 
after Yugoslavia's defeat, but would always encourage 
Yugoslav resistance. The United States would have little 
contact with Yugoslavia until late 1943, when America again 
began to study the Yugoslav situation. The United States 
would follow the British example and make contacts with the 
Yugoslavs. Unfortunately, by this time even the limited 
amount of pre-War knowledge the United States had obtained 
was worthless. Yugoslavia was changing, and the United 
States had to come to terms with a different and dynamic 
situation. 
The United States maintained diplomatic relations with 
the Yugoslav government in exile, but was also very 
concerned with the events then occurring inside Yugoslavia. 
16 
The emergence/discovery of the Yugoslav civil war and of the 
two main resistance movements within the country were new 
factors with which the United States had to come to grips. 
~ The problems of a Serb resistance movement under Draza 
MihailoviC"and a communist movement under the leadership of 
Josip Broz Tito created much discussion within the u. s. 
government. The eventual emergence of Tito as ruler and 
leader of Yugoslavia was a problem for the United States, 
one with which it had trouble dealing. 
The United States would eventually recognize the Tito 
regime, but only after it was determined to be the actual 
power within the country. Even then debate was strong about 
attempting to change the situation. But American war aims 
in the Pacific and the reluctance to become involved in the 
Balkans created the acceptance of the new Yugoslavia. 
CHAPTER 2 
1941 
In early 1941, Yugoslavia found itself in a very 
hostile environment. The Germans were victorious 
throughout Europe, Austria, Czechoslovakia, western Poland, 
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
France--all were made a part of Hitler's empire. 
Yugoslavia's neighbors were allied to Germany through 
various pacts. Austria to the north was an integral part of 
the German nation and no longer existed independently; 
Bulgaria and Hungary were both members of the Tripartite 
Pact and, along with western neighbor Italy, were glancing 
at Yugoslavia with expectations of future acquisitions. 
Italy had already made itself ruler of Albania and 
confronted Yugoslavia in both the far north and the 
southwest, not to mention the Italian cities on the 
Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia. Rumania, a former Yugoslav 
ally, had also become a member of the Tripartite Pact. Only 
Greece, Yugoslavia's neighbor to the south, was not a member 
of the pact, nor could it be expected to attack Yugoslavia. 
The two remaining Western powers, Great Britain and the 
18 
United States, were now anxious to help Yugoslavia. The 
United States was at this time not directly involved in the 
war, but ties with Great Britain were becoming much 
stronger. The American government had no illusions about 
Hitler and was working, however cautiously, for a German 
defeat. Great Britain had already seen considerable action 
against the Germans and was looking to gain any type of 
advantage it could against Germany. Thus, British hopes 
turned to the Balkans as Great Britain tried to ally itself 
1 
with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. 
The Yugoslav government and its leader Prince Paul 
were under great pressure. The Germans were beginning to 
become adamant about Yugoslavia's accession to the 
Tripartite Pact. On the other hand, Great Britain, with 
active American support, was trying to prevent any type of 
Yugoslav-German agreement. The Yugoslavs had declared their 
neutrality when the war finally broke out on September 3. 
This was viewed differently by the two camps competing for 
Yugoslavia's favor. 
To the Western Allies this was represented as a 
temporary expedient, necessitated by the country's 
military unpreparedness and exposed position, but 
not the product of any doubts as to the outcome of 
the war, while to the Axis powers it was portrayed 
as the best guarantee of their preeminent economic 
and political interests in the region--to the 
former, neutrality with a mask1 to the latter as a 
neutrality with a tilt.2 
Both sides had advantages in gaining Yugoslavia's 
favor. The strongest position belonged to the Germans. 
19 
Germany had been Yugoslavia's largest trading partner for 
years, and German armies had swept all foes before them. 
This, of course, included the British, whose prestige had 
naturally suffered in Yugoslavia because of its failure to 
halt the German drives in France and Poland. The British 
and the Americans were, on the other hand, viewed as 
Yugoslavia's natural allies. The United States was known by 
many Yugoslavs as a home for its people. These Yugoslavs, 
regardless of ethnic background, put pressure on their 
former homeland. 
Hundreds of telegrams were sent to the Yugoslav 
government from Croatians, Serbs, and Slovenes from 
throughout the United States and Canada urging Yugoslavia to 
stand firm against German demands. It was reported that 
groups representing over 300,000 Yugoslavs in America were 
urgently requesting Yugoslavia to stand fast. The President 
of the Supreme Council of the Serb National Federation, Simo 
Werlinich, had written Prince Paul and Cvetkovic" urging 
Yugoslavia to stand against the barbarians and once again to 
3 
def end their land in the name of freedom. 
Winston Churchill, although heavily involved, realized 
the position of Prince Paul. He wrote somewhat 
sympathetically: 
20 
In the face of it, Prince Paul's attitude looks 
like that of an unfortunate man in a cage with a 
tiger [Hitler], hoping not to provoke him while 
steadily dinner-time approaches.4 
Arthur Bliss Lane also showed his understanding of the 
Yugoslav situation. He wrote to the Secretary of State from 
Belgrade on on February 14, 1941: 
As to Yugoslavia and Turkey he [Prince Paul] said 
that we do not intend to enter war, yet 
unofficially we advise small countries to resist. 
I replied that if the United States were threatened 
with invasion, we would certainly resist and that 
we are not suggesting to Yugoslavia or any other 
country to take offensive action.5 
Yugoslavia was also at this time of considerable 
importance to the press. The fighting in January, 1941 had 
slowed considerably as Germany was consolidating and 
preparing for future moves. This brought the focus of the 
press on Yugoslavia and Greece, the most logical places for 
Germany's next move. The press wrote at some length about 
internal Yugoslav politics. It was pointed out on many 
occasions that Yugoslavia, though united for the moment, 
suffered from internal ethnic frictions. Yugoslavia was 
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reported as the "Sweden of southeastern Europe." The New 
York Times put much emphasis on a speech given by German 
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. 
Yugoslavia always will be a neighbor of the Reich, 
and she will therefore always remain economically 
tied to Germany. From that, political cooperation 
must inevitably follow.7 
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As can be seen from the above, Yugoslavia's position 
was realized, if not appreciated, in the West. Regardless, 
the United States and Great Britain began an intensive 
campaign to keep Yugoslavia out of the German camp. This 
campaign was carried on through normal diplomatic channels, 
but enlisted, as the need arose, the highest personages in 
both Great Britain and the United States. The British, who 
had entered the war and were still involved in almost daily 
combat with the Germans were the first to become actively 
involved with the Yugoslavs. Great Britain established the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) in July of 1940. Its aim 
was to aid British foreign policy through covert activities. 
Recognizing the importance of Serbia within Yugoslavia, the 
SOE spent most of its energy in that part of the country. 
It did, however, maintain contacts throughout Yugoslavia. 
Mark Wheeler described the purpose of the SOE as a secret 
service 
designed to reinforce the work of diplomats, 
creating by the use of subsidies, bribes, and 
propaganda, a pro-British climate of opinion in 
Yugoslavia (and especially in Serbia) that would 
make it difficult for Prince Paul and his ministers 
to knuckle under to the Axis.a 
The British would spare no efforts in trying to prevent 
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Yugoslavia's joining of the Tripartite Pact. 
The British felt that Prince Paul would be very 
susceptible to their blandishments. He was fluent in 
English an had received his college training in England at 
Oxford. He had also been known for his pro-British views 
within Yugoslavia. He had sought British economic and 
diplomatic aid for Yugoslavia in the mid-Thirties, but was 
now in a much different position due to Germany's present 
strength. 
The British were husbanding their military resources 
very closely and were unable to give any military aid to 
Yugoslavia. They did, however, try to encourage the 
Yugoslavs by other means. King George VI wrote Prince Paul 
encouraging his anti-German sympathies for the first time on 
july 3, 1940. The King would later follow with additional 
correspondence, but never was able to offer Prince Paul 
anything concrete. British policy was aimed at impressing 
the Yugoslavs with her growing strength and absolute faith 
in an ultimate victory for Great Britain. 
The British by March 1941 had committed combat units in 
Greece and were in a frantic search to bolster their 
position. The British position depended on Yugoslavia 
agreeing to fight the Germans. "The whole defense of 
9 
Salonika depended on their [Yugoslavia's] coming in." The 
British, and Churchill in particular, put great credence in 
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Yugoslav arms. The Serb army in the First World War had 
fought brilliantly, and a repeat was expected in 1941. The 
British expected Yugoslavia to help stabilize and support 
them in Greece, but saw other immediate missions for the 
Yugoslav Army. Churchill wrote that an attack by Yugoslavia 
on the Italians could " ••• produce an Italian disaster of 
the first magnitude, possibly decisive on the whole Balkan 
10 
situation." 
The British position became even more frantic when it 
learned of Germany's ultimatum to Prince Paul on March 26, 
1941. Churchill instructed the British minister in 
Belgrade, Ronald Ian Campbell thusly: 
Do not let any gap grow up between you and Prince 
Paul or ministers. Continue to pester, nag, and 
bite. Demand audiences. Don't take No for an 
answer. Cling on them, pointing out Germans are 
already taking the subjugation of the country for 
granted. This is not time for reproaches or 
dignified farewells. Meanwhile, at the same time, 
do not neglect any alternative to which we may have 
to resort if we find present Governments have gone 
beyond recall.11 
Churchill had previously telegraphed Cvetkovic', but believed 
now that it was too late to expect the Yugoslav government 
not to sign the Pact. 
The British government had decided earlier that 
although it could not materially aid Yugoslavia in its 
present situation, it could offer other inducements. 
Despite Britain's (and America's) express policy of 
not discussing postwar territorial settlements, the 
War Cabinet considered that 'the decision of the 
Yugoslav government at the prsent juncture is of 
such importance that it would be worthwhile to 
disregard this rule on this occasion if by doing so 
we could induce Yugoslavia to intervene forcibly on 
behalf of Greece.' The Foreign Secretary was 
authorized on 3 March to open to the Yugoslavs the 
prospect of territorial revisions if this appeared 
likely to encourage them 'to throw in their lot 
with us'.12 
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The British had by now seen little prospect in changing 
Yugoslavia's course and began to seriously think of other 
possibilities. " ••• SOE's objective 'inevitably changed 
from that of endeavoring to influence the government to that 
13 
of endeavoring to bring down the government'." Anthony 
Eden, British Foreign Secretary, telegraphed Campbell in 
Belgrade on March 24: 
••• 'Prince Paul's attitude shows such a 
hopeless sense of unreality that there is nothing 
to be expected of him.' He empowered the Minister 
'now to proceed at your own discretion by any means 
at your disposal to move leaders and public opinion 
to understanding realities and to action to meet 
the situation •••• You have my full authority for 
any such measures that you think it right to take 
to further change of government or regime, even by 
coup d'etat.' 
The next day, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact. 
The United States during this time frame was also 
diplomatically active in Yugoslavia. Although not actively 
engaged in the war like the British, the Americans had a 
very similar policy. This, of course, was to prevent 
25 
Yugoslav accession to the Tripartite Pact. American 
activities and actions were closely parallel and 
complementary to those of the British. However, only 
Britain was at war with Germany and only Britain had combat 
troops in the Balkans. 
President Roosevelt's fireside chat of December 29 1940
is a good starting point to trace American relations with 
Yugoslavia. This speech declared that the United States 
would become the "arsenal of democracy" and that America 
would stand beside its British ally. The speech was 
discussed in Yugoslavia and gave the American and British 
position some additional weight. It is of course even more 
important to notice that the entire speech was not published 
in the Yugoslav press. " [Yugoslav] Foreign Office had 
eliminated passages which they thought might be offensive to
15 
Hitler." 
It was the American policy to keep the Yugoslavs from 
signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany. Lane, the 
American Minister in Belgrade, was the individual most 
responsible for pressing American positions and beliefs on 
the Yugoslav government. He was assisted in January 1941 by 
a visit of Colonel William J. Donovan. 
He explained to them the established United States 
policy of giving every possible assistance short of 
war to countries willing to fight for their 
independence.16 
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Donovan was on a special mission for Roosevelt trying to 
ascertain Yugoslavia's position. The United States was now 
17 
watching Yugoslav developments "with great concern." 
Lane explained the American attitude towards Yugoslav 
accession to the Tripartite Pact to Yugoslav Foreign 
~ 
Minister Alexander Cincar-Markovic on February 9: 
I expressed my personal opinion that countries that 
do not resist aggression are not worthy of 
independence and need not count on our support when 
political and geographic readjustments are made 
after the war ••• that we are committed to full 
support of all people who resist aggression. I 
believe even at this late hour in present critical 
situations in Balkans the result would be 
salutary.18 
I 
A week after Lane's meeting with Cincar-Markovic, he 
wrote Washington about his discussion on February 18 with 
Prince Paul. Prince Paul again outlined Yugoslavia's 
position in Europe and the great strength of Germany. 
He said even if the United States helped him 
Yugoslavia would be finished before our assistance 
arrived and the country would be destroyed in the 
meantime.19 
Regardless of these opinions, pressure continued to be 
placed on Prince Paul. 
The United States, like Great Britain, was not above 
having the Chief of State send personal messages to the 
Yugoslav Head of State. Roosevelt sent a personal message 
to Prince Paul on February 22. 
I am addressing this message to Your Royal Highness 
with a view to emphasizing the interest of the 
United States in the outcome of the war. I fully 
appreciate the difficult and vital problems facing 
you and the Yugoslav government, but I most 
earnestly wish to point out that the United States 
is looking not merely to the present but to the 
future. I wish to convey to you my feeling that the 
world in general regards with very real sympathy 
any nation which resists attack, both military or 
diplomatic, by the predatory powers.20 
The Yugoslav internal situation was by now being 
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closely watched in the press. Yugoslavia was described by 
The New York Times on January 18, 1941 as Germany's debtor. 
The Yugoslav government had been purchasing huge amounts of 
war materials, and her balance of trade with Germany was 
deeply out of balance. The ability to pay for this debt was 
viewed as dim at best. This was a change in Yugoslav 
economic relations vis-a-vis Germany, which had since 1934 
always showed a surplus in favor of Yugoslavia. As 
previously mentioned, this gave the Germans added confidence 
in their dealings with Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslavs had also been described as indebted to 
the Germans for helping keep Yugoslav resistance/separatist 
movements under some control. Now, however, the press was 
describing more fully Yugoslav government actions against 
Croat separatists and terrorists. Yugoslavia was shown to 
be deeply divided, and for the first time, in economic 
jeopardy to a foreign power. Also by this time Yugoslavia's 
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geographic isolation was fully appreciated by even the most 
casual observer of Yugoslav events. 
By March 1941, it had become apparent to both the 
United States government and the press that events would 
soon take their own course in Yugoslavia. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull wrote Roosevelt concerning events in 
Yugoslavia on March 12, 1941. He reminded the President 
that the American government had been in almost constant 
touch with the nonaligned Balkan states. Hull stated that 
the United States had made its position on aiding Britain 
and any other nation resisting foreign domination. It was 
stressed time and again that the "vast resources" of the 
United States would be used to supply these nations. Hull 
believed that he and his representatives had done 
~verything in their power to bolster the morale of the 
Balkan nations (Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). He was 
able to point out that he had constantly sought out 
suggestions from these lands as to how the United States 
could best support them. Hull remarked that the 
representatives only requested one additional thing and that 
was the actual stationing of large numbers of combat troops 
with sufficient material aid to help stop any German 
21 
thrust. 
Even before Hull's message to the President, events in 
Yugoslavia were beginning to move even faster. The New York 
------
Times reported on March 5 that Yugoslavia had ordered full 
29 
mobilization. It was stated that Yugoslavia would have 
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1,000,000 men in the field by March 21. Opposition 
leaders in Yugoslavia were also reported to have decided 
that "any kind of paper with Germany will mean the immediate 
downfall of the [Yugoslav] government, revolt in the army 
and spontaneous rebellion throughout the country ••• " The 
article added " ••• such declaration must be naturally 
23 
viewed with extreme caution." The paper was also 
describing the activities of Lane at this moment as 
24 
"extraordinarily active." 
On March 14, the National Bank of Yugoslavia sent a 
request to the American Secretary of the Treasury, that 
Yugoslav gold reserves in the United States be removed from 
the United States. This amounted to $22 million, and the 
request was immediately sent over to the Secretary of State. 
Hull saw no valid reasons for the Yugoslav request and 
delayed any answer. However, the funds would remain where 
they were. The opinion of Hull was that the funds were 
already in a safe place and that the United States would use 
25 
them only to further Yugoslav interests. 
Lane telegraphed Washington twice, once on March 16 and 
again on March 19, warning the State Department that 
Yugoslavia was about to sign the Tripartite Pact. These 
notes prompted a meeting between Sumner Welles, Acting 
Secretary of State, and Constantine Fotid, Yugoslav Minister 
30 
to the United States. Welles explained to Fotid that if 
Yugoslavia signed the Pact, public opinion in the United 
States would be outraged and all Yugoslav assets in this 
country would be frozen as well as the chance for any 
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American aid for Yugoslavia. Welles followed this meeting 
by sending instructions to Lane for transmittal of this 
message to the Yugoslav government. 
Lane met Prince Paul on the 20th of March and outlined 
the American position. He told the Prince of Italy's poor 
position in Albania, British naval successes against Italy 
in the Adriatic and Mediterranean and of British landings 
and troop reinforcements on the Greek mainland. He again 
told him of America's and President Roosevelt's wish for 
Yugoslavia to remain outside the Tripartite Pact. 
The United States, as long as Yugoslavia retains 
her entire independence and freedom of action in 
defense of her own territory, is prepared to offer 
all facilities under the Lend-Lease Bill which is 
now law, and finally in accordance with the terms 
of the message recently sent you in that regard, 
those Yugoslav assets which are now on deposit in 
the United States will remain at her disposal as 
long as in the interpretation of this government 
Yugoslavia remains a free and independent 
country.27 
Lane sent a message to the Secretary of State in which he 
described Prince Paul as unswayed by the American agreement. 
Lane would meet frequently for the next couple of days 
the Yugoslav government officials trying to sway them away 
from signing the Tripartite Pact. , I He met Cvetkovic on the 
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22nd of March, who said that Yugoslavia would soon sign the 
~ pact. Cvetkovic termed Lane's arguments as 
not very strong. He lamely explained that 
Yugoslavia's adherence should not be regarded as a 
move against us or Britain. The Pact is purely 
political, not military. I said [Lane], I am sure 
action would have most unfavorable effect in United 
States where Yugoslav courage has been a 
tradition.28 
On March 23, 1941, The New York Times revealed that 
The Yugoslav government committed itself tonight to 
enter the Axis orbit despite grave fears that the 
step might cause civil war. Mass resignations -Of 
high officials opposed to the alliance and uneasy 
friction in the army ranks were grave 
manifestations of the violent and growing internal 
descent.29 
In spite of ali efforts by British and American 
officials, the Yugoslavs signed the Tripartite Pact on the 
25th of March. The signing of the Pact set off a chain 
reaction. The American and British governments were very 
upset at the news, and the press termed Yugoslavia's signing 
of the Pact as "surrender and capitualtion." The next day, 
the United States government through an Executive Order 
froze all Yugoslav assets. Sumner Welles at a press 
conference announced that the United States had been 
working for weeks trying to prevent Yugoslavia's signature. 
He also explained why Yugoslav assets had been frozen 
• • • since the primary purpose of this government 
was to preserve the assets held in the United 
States for the peoples of the countries that had 
fallen into the Nazi orbit. That was the basis on 
which steps were taken in every instance.30 
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Events in Yugoslavia took another turn on the 27th of 
March. A coup d'etat in Belgrade overthrew the government 
of Prince Paul and the Regency. The coup led by Air 
Force General Du~an Simovid'immediately placed King Peter on 
the throne but did not repudiate the signing of the 
Tripartite Pact with Germany. The coup was viewed with 
instantaneous approval, both in the United States and 
especially in Great Gritain. 
The coup in Belgrade was basically a Serbian affair. 
Althugh both the Americans and the British were against the 
Pact and worked accordingly, their influence was nominal. 
There have been some arguments by British historians about 
SOE's importance or lack of importance in helping to create 
the coup. However, available evidence indicates that it was 
an internal Yugoslav event, led almost entirely by Serbs. 
No realistic Yugoslav could have really expected much aid 
from either of the democracies, although some did expect it. 
There is no doubt that most Yugoslavs found it much easier 
to be aligned with the United States and Great Britain, but 
that the efforts of these two countries had only nominal 
effect on the actions of the Yugoslav officers. 
Churchill was elated by the news of the coup and 
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exclaimed that the Yugoslav nation "had found her soul." He 
wrote that "The news of the revolution in Belgrade naturally 
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gave us great satisfaction." He immediately wished to 
send the Foreign Secretary to Belgrade for talks, but this 
request was refused by the Yugoslavs, who did not wish to 
offend Hitler. However, Field Marshall John Dill, Commander 
of the Imperial General Staff, was sent to Belgrade. 
Dill arrived in Belgrade to try to coordinate the 
movements of the Yugoslav and Greek armies. He also pushed 
for an immediate Yugoslav attack on the Italian positions in 
Albania. Dill was disappointed in his discussions in 
Belgrade and believed the Yugoslavs showed " ••• failure to 
appreciate the immediacy of his [Simovic's] country's 
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peril." The Yugoslavs in turn were very surprised at the 
lack of British power in Greece. 
The United States reacted differently from the British~ 
and direct military discussions, such as those Dill 
attempted with SimoviC', did not come into question. 
The Acting Secretary of State, Welles, instructed Lane to 
meet with the new Yugoslav government as soon as possible. 
• • • and state in the name of your government 
that the news which has reached this country of the 
constitution of the new government under the King 
and General Simovic has created the immediate 
popular reactioan that this event constitutes a 
matter of self-congratulation for every liberty-
loving man and woman. 
You are further authorized to state that in 
accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease 
Bill, the President, in the interest of the 
national defense of the United States, is enabled 
to provide assistance to Yugoslavia, like all 
others nations which are seeking to maintain their 
independence and integrity and to repel 
aggression.33 
President Roosevelt on the next day (March 28) sent a 
34 
telegram to King Peter. This was a personal message to the 
young King offering support and best wishes from the 
President. 
Lane was informed from Washington on March 28, that the 
United States government had never withdrawn recognition 
from the monarchy and that nothing was required now to 
34 
recognize the new Yugoslav Government. Lane met with 
General Simovit on March 28 and explained to him that 
America 
• • • had never urged on previous governments such 
a move [offensive action against Germany] and my 
efforts had been solely to prevent Yugoslavia from 
relinquishing her independence.35 
The next day, Lane met with the new Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister, Mom~ilo Nin~ic', who requested that Yugoslav assets 
in the United States be frozen. Moreover, events would 
again direct the American response, and Nin~ic's question 
went unanswered. 
The reaction by the general public in the United States 
had been very favorable to the Yugoslav coup. The New York 
35 
Times was very strong in its praise for the Yugoslav action. 
The paper printed a long editorial in the March 28th 
edition, praising Yugoslavia. The sensational coup was 
compared to a lightening flash against a dark horizon. The 
Yugoslavs were well organized and were the first to show the 
world what the peoples of Europe really thought of Hitler. 
The King was described as riding through the streets of 
Belgrade as the populace rose up in wild celebration and the 
army prepared for the defense of the border. The paper 
termed the coup as "epoch-making" and was probably organized 
and abetted with British help. The Yugoslavs were described 
as ready to def end their land to the end and the paper said 
that the nation's true feelings were out in the open for all 
to see. It spoke of the Americans of Yugoslav descent who 
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had been relieved and overjoyed by Yugoslavia's action. 
The reactions were unanimously favorable in both 
Britain and the United States; however, with these reactions 
came heightened expectations of Yugoslav action. As already 
mentioned, the British had sent General Dill to Belgrade for 
military talks with Yugoslavia. The British officer left 
frustrated and disappointed, but this was not known by the 
press. c. L. Sulzberger wrote that "overnight the Balkan 
balance has been astonishingly changed by the dramatic 
Yugoslav coup, which reinforces Allied positions on the 
37 
Continent." The papers were full of articles describing 
Yugoslavia's million man army and the country's long history 
36 
of military battles. Yugoslav soldiers were described as 
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having "the reputation of being the best in the world." 
The population was described as "bellicose" and "committed 
39 
to war." 
The New York Times was consistent in its praises for 
the Yugoslav army, usually, as seen above, sparing no 
adjectives in its descriptions. Articles pointed out that 
Yugoslav terrain was ideal for a prolonged resistance. 
Yugoslavia was described as having approximately 18 first-
line divisions and a total army of 32 divisions. These 
divisions, although short in artillery, were expected to 
accomplish much and soon. The paper wrote on a couple of 
occasions that it expected Yugoslavia to attack the Italians 
in Albania and gain easy victories there (March 31 and April 
1) • 
Even Lane's reports seemed more optimistic than before. 
He described his March 31 meeting with King Peter very 
favorably. He wrote the Secretary of State: "His show of 
moral courage • • • and his evident desire to rely on the 
United States give me great hope for his future and for that 
40 
of his country." 
Yugoslavia was invaded on April 6 , 1941 by Germany, 
Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The reaction in Great Britain 
and the United States was swift. Both countries deplored 
this action of Nazi aggression. Cordell Hull stated: 
The barbaric invasion of Yugoslavia and the attempt 
to annihilate that country by brute force is but 
another chapter in the present planned movement of 
attempted world conquest • • • 41 
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The Secretary of State added in a message delivered in 
Belgrade by Lane to the Yugoslav government: 
The American people have the greatest sympathy for 
the nation which has been so outrageously attacked, 
and we follow closely the valiant struggle the 
Yugoslav people are making to protect their homes 
and preserve their liberty. 
This government, with its policy of helping those 
who are defending themselves against would-be 
conquerors, is now proceeding as speedily as 
possible to send military and other supplies to 
Yugoslavia.42 
This message was followed on April 8 by a personal 
message from Roosevelt to King Peter encouraging Yugoslav 
resistance. Roosevelt sent "his most earnest hopes for a 
successful resistance to this criminal assault upon the 
43 
independence and integrity of your country." 
Attempts on the part of private individuals and 
associations to aid Yugoslavia were not slow in developing. 
The American Red Cross announced on April 7 that it was 
prepared to send $1,000,000 in medical and relief supplies 
to Yugoslavia immediately. Prominent members of New York 
business and society also announced efforts to assist 
Yugoslavia. This last group would later develop into the 
Organization of the American Friends of Yugoslavia. 
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However, it soon became apparent that the Yugoslav Army was 
in desperate trouble, and aid from any outside source would 
not reach Yugoslavia for months. 
Roosevelt applied the Neutrality Act to Yugoslavia on 
April 12, 1941, effectively stifling all American aid to 
Yugoslavia. The Neutrality Act of 1939 was established to 
prevent the United States from becoming involved in 
conflict. It was noted, however, that Roosevelt did not 
apply the Neutrality Act to Yugoslavia until it was obvious 
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that Yugoslavia could not resist much longer. Yugoslavia 
collapsed on April 17, 1941, and surrendered to the Germans. 
With the defeat, Yugoslavia was immediately divided by 
the victors. Serbia was greatly reduced and placed under 
rigid German control. Croatia was elevated to an 
independent country by both the Germans and the Italians and 
~ 
was governed by Dr. Ante Pavelic and his U~ta~e upon their 
return to the country, with the invaders. Slovenia was 
incorporated directly into Germany and Italy and was 
therefore given no status at all. Yugoslavia was also faced 
with occupation armies from Hungary in the north and 
Bulgaria in the Macedonian region. 
The quick and easy defeat of Yugoslavia came as a shock 
to both the United States and Great Britain, but the 
immediate public reaction came from the press. Yugoslavia 
was once described as a military power, but was now 
described as being disunited and militarily unprepared to 
39 
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meet the invasion. Yugoslavia was not slow to take a back 
seat in the minds of Americans. It would never again 
achieve the status with either the American government or 
the people that it had enjoyed following the coup. J 
For the remainder of 1941, the American government 
would have limited contact with the Yugoslav government. 
Lane, the last American representative in Yugoslavia, left 
the country on May 16. There were, however, several 
meetings in Washington between the State Department and the 
Yugoslav Ambassador FotiC. Foticprotested on several 
occasions about the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and was 
assured by the American government that the partitions of 
Yugoslavia were not recognized by the United States. The 
American entrance into the war on December 7, 1941, would 
place Yugoslav issues far back on the scale of priorities 
for the United States. It would be many months before the 
United States would begin to be active in Yugoslav affairs. 
The previously-mentioned Organization of the American 1 
Friends of Yugoslavia was founded on May 21, 1942, and it 
did keep the issue of Yugoslavia in the public eye from time 
to time. This group included the Governor of New York, 
Wendell L. Wilkie; the Presidents of Yale, Johns Hopkins, 
and Occidental College (Hamilton Fish Armstrong); and the 
Presidents of the Chase Manhattan Bank and International 
Business Machines (IBM). This organization would not act 
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independently, but turn over its fund to the Red Cross for 
distribution in Yugoslavia. The organization was declared 
to be " ••• a tangible demonstration of the affection and 
esteem which the American nation has for the Yugoslav 
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people." 
Organization of the American Friends of Yugoslavia held 
a "gala" affair in New York on September 6, 1941. Speeches 
were made over a national radio hook-up on the CBS Radio 
~ 
Network. King Peter and General Simovic spoke via short 
wave radio to this group (and to the entire nation) from 
London. The Yugoslavs were again cited for their courage, 
and a message from Roosevelt to King Peter was read. 
CHAPTER 3 
1942 
Events in Yugoslavia were unknown to the outside world 
for months after German forces overran the country. 
However, activity was not slow in developing outside and 
within the country. Survivors of the Yugoslav Army went into 
the hills with their weapons and began to plan a resistance 
movement against the invaders. Outside the country, members 
of the Yugoslav government led by the King reestablished 
their government. The groups inside the country would be 
led by a former member of the Yugoslav General Staff, 
Colonel Draza MihailoviC: Mihailovic~and his group, who 
were predominantly Serbian, began coordinating resistance 
efforts in Bosnia and Serbia by the middle of May 1941. 
v 
This group was soon labelled the Cetniks, a term used by 
Serbian resistance fighters since their struggles for 
1 
independence against Turkey in the early 19th century. The 
~ 
Cetniks would remain the official Yugoslav military 
representatives in the country for the future and would 
attempt to stay in contact with the Yugoslav government in 
exile. 
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The second resistance group was slower in entering the 
war but did so in July of 1941. This group was called the 
Partisans and was led by Josip Broz (Tito). Tito was head 
of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and the most important 
Partisan leadership was Communist. Tito himself had been 
placed at the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1939 
by Moscow,. which he visited on a few occasions during the 
period between the two world wars. The Communist Party had 
been outlawed in Yugoslavia since August 9, 1921. This 
created a very small and close-knit organization that was 
used to functioning under clerks. It was, however, not 
without experienced military leaders, as many Yugoslav 
Communists had fought in the Spanish Civil War. The 
~ 
Partisans, like the Cetniks, went into the mountainous areas 
of Bosnia. 
Initially, there was some minor cooperation between the 
two resistance groups, and Tito and Mihailovic did meet 
twice during October 1941. The last formal meeting between 
the two groups was on November 19, 1941, but neither 
Mihailovid nor Tito participated in that gathering. The two 
groups developed different beliefs regarding the best way to 
defend Yugoslavia. The Cetniks thought it best to organize 
and prepare for the eventual defeat of Germany and spare the 
country the massive reprisals of the Germans. Tito's 
followers were more interested in attacking and fighting the 
Germans. 
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The two movements also had different political arms. 
The Cetniks were, for the most part, loyal members of the 
Yugoslav Army and wished to preserve the pre-war Yugoslavia. 
This was not the case with the Partisans, who were 
considered outlaws and part of an illegal organization. 
Their goal was to create a socialist Yugoslavia, and they 
had no wish to preserve the pre-war Yugoslavia. 
The Partisans were revolutionaries, the Cetniks 
were for the restoration of the status quo. The 
Partisans appealed to the broad masses of all 
Yugoslavia, but the Cetniks restricted their 
appeal, with minor exceptions, to the Serbs.2 
These different political aims quickly caused the two groups 
to become suspicious of each other; and by 1941, they would, 
in fact, be in many instances more interested in fighting 
each other than in fighting their country's invaders. 
The existence of resistance within Yugoslavia became 
known to the United States and Great Britain by the summer 
of 1941. However, the actual conditions within the country 
were unknown, and any discussion of the resistance by either 
the United States or Great Britain naturally would be 
~ ~ 
centered on the Cetniks. This was normal, as the Cetniks 
represented the Yugoslav government, which by January 11, 
~ 1942 was led by then-Brigadier General Mihailovic, who was 
appointed Yugoslav Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. Tito and the Communists, on the other hand, were 
virtually unknown and controlled no sources of power or 
persuasion outside of Yugoslavia. Although fragile, 
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Yugoslav resistance to Nazi domination attracted British and 
later American interest. 
The first Allied mission arrived in Yugoslavia on 
September 20, 1941. This was a four-man group led by 
British Captain D. T. (Bill) Hudson, who parachuted into 
Montenegro (Crna Gora) with a radio and three Montenegrin 
soldiers. Hudson's mission was "to contact, investigate and 
report on all groups offering resistance to the enemy, 
3 
regardless of race, creed, or political persuasion." 
Hudson would meet both Tito and Mihailovi~ while in 
Yugoslavia, but for the most part he spent his time alone. 
Hudson was soon followed by other British missions, but 
information was still very scarce on actual events within 
Yugoslavia. 
During the next several months, the intermittent 
nature of communications with Mihailovic, the 
failure to establish other intelligence missions 
••• and the absence of any overwhelming military 
interest caused the British to relegate Yugoslav 
resistance to a very secondary importance.4 
It is important to note that the British began sending 
missions into Yugoslavia with Hudson in September of 1941, 
but the Americans did not send their first mission into the 
country until August of 1943, and then only as a part of the 
larger British mission already established. There was, 
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however, contact between the American and Yugoslav 
governments continuously during this time frame. But any 
American knowledge of events in Yugoslavia had to come from 
non-American sources. For the most part, American 
information and interaction with with Yugoslavia came from 
, 
the Yugoslav Minister in Washington, Fotic. 
; 
Fotic himself became a source of some problems for the 
American government.* He was, however, reaffirmed as the 
recognized representative of the Royal Yugoslav government 
on February 13, 1942. A message from Sumner Welles also 
reiterated American recognition of the Yugoslav government. 
. , 
The United States sent Fotic another note on April 22, 1942 
in response to Yugoslav descriptions of events in 
Yugoslavia. 
The government and people of the United States 
have watched with admiration the resourceful and 
heroic operations of General Mihajlovic 
[Mihailovic] and his men and are proud to 
acknowledge the contribution of Yugoslav patriots in 
the common struggle against the forces bent on the 
destruction of free nations throughout the world.6 
The most important event in Yugoslav-American relations 
during 1942 took place from June 22 to July 29 when King 
Peter visited the United States. The King was accompanied 
by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mom~ilo Nincic. He 
* Fotid"'was a strong supporter of Serbia and was extremely 
anti-Communist and, to a lesser extent, anti-Croat. His 
reports to the American government were colored by his 
"Pan Serb" beliefs. 
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received all the honors of a visiting head of state when 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull escorted him from 
Washington's Union Station to the White House where he spent 
the night of June 24, 1942. Here conversations were held 
with Roosevelt and other members of the American government 
as well as with Churchill, who was also a guest in 
Washington at this time. 
The King described his conversation as follows: 
Our discussion that evening mainly concerned the 
extent to which the United States could help 
Yugoslavia in sending supplies to Mihailovich 
[Mihailovic] and his Chetniks [Cetniks]. Roosevelt 
pointed out that he was severely pressed just then 
• • • • Nevertheless the President stressed his 
sympathy for the Yugoslav patriots •••• 7 
The King spent a total of seven days in Washington on his 
"official" visit and met most of the senior members of the 
Unitd States government. He spoke on June 25 to a joint 
session of Congress and later that day visited the American 
Red Cross Headquarters and the National Press Club. 
The King also met with members of Yugoslav 
organizations in the United States and attended luncheons by 
the Organization of American Friends of Yugoslavia in both 
Washington and New York. In New York, he also spoke over 
the NBC Radio Network to the entire American nation. The 
King also toured the American heavy industry belt from 
Detroit to Buffalo before returning to Washington on July 24. 
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He again held meetings with Roosevelt, and they issued 
a joint statement which read in part: 
We are in complete accord on the fundamental 
principle that all our resources of the two nations 
should be devoted to the vigorous prosecution of 
the war; that like the fine achievement of General 
Mihailovich [Mihailovic] and his daring men, an 
example of spontaneous and unselfish will to 
victory, our common effort shall seek every means 
to defeat the enemies of all free nations.a 
The King left the country with more than feelings of 
good will. The United States and Yugoslavia signed a Lend-
Lease Agreement on July 24. The King wrote "So everything 
was cordial when, in July of 1942, I left the White House in 
9 
Washington after conferring with President Roosevelt • 
On August 3, Roosevelt wrote the King a personal note 
wherein he also was very positive about the visit. 
Your Majesty's visit was a personal pleasure which 
I shall long remember. It gave also to the 
American people an opportunity to do honor to the 
valiant Yugoslav people in their noble and 
unceasing fight for the liberation of their 
country.10 
" 
Following the King's visit, the United States began to 
receive more information on events within Yugoslavia. This 
information would create the atmosphere for Yugoslav-
American relations for months in the future. The primary 
source for American knowledge of internal affairs in 
Yugoslavia came from Yugoslav sources, again primarily 
~ .., " Ambassador Fotic and Foreign Minister Nincic. 
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For the most part, official Yugoslav sources were 
telling the American government that events in Yugoslavia 
were very confused. However, they always stressed the 
accomplishments of Mihailovic, both political and military, 
and described the atrocities and terrorist methods of the 
Partisans/Communists, as well as the number of Serbs being 
butchered by the Ustasa in Croatia. Ninci~ said that by 
September 1942, over 600,000 Serbs had been murdered and 
v ~ 
over 300,000 had fled the Ustasa. He also was bitter about 
the press in the United States which seemed to lack proper 
knowledge of Mihailovi~'s valiant efforts. Nintic"' (as well 
as other members of the Yugoslav government--Foti~ ·in 
particular) described the Partisans as "a collection of 
international criminals, most of them brought in from 
12 
abroad." The Communists were usually described as doing 
virtually no fighting compared with Mihailovi~'s ceaseless 
efforts against the invaders. 
The various Serb, Croat, and Slovene periodicals in the 
United States began to write articles about events in 
Yugoslavia. The Serbs were accusing the Croats of 
atrocities, and the Croats were calling the Serbs liars. 
This issue prompted Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr. to speak before the editors of the Yugoslav 
foreign language press in America. He made statements to 
the group concerning the Yugoslav issues to the effect 
that we had no interest in these various 
controversies since we believed that the war had to 
be won by united American'effort, and that these 
people ought to get together as Americans and leave 
their European differenaces over. 
He also said 
that while we had no interest ~n the politics of 
General Mihailovicz [Mihailovic] , so long as he was 
fighting the Germans we were for him, and that up 
to that date we had no information leading us to 
believe that he was doing anything but fight[ing] 
Germans.13 
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Later, Berle would call this squabble in the Yugoslav press 
14 
in America "a danger to the American war effort." 
It should be stated that the American government also 
was receiving some information about Yugoslavia from other 
sources and these seemed to contradict the stories of 
I Communist atrocities and Mihailovic's reputation as a 
crusading warrior. Sumner Welles wrote to Ambassador Foti6 
(the Yugoslav mission was raised to the status of an Embassy 
on September 29, 1942): 
Reports indicate that the conflict between , 
Mihajlovic [Mihailovic] forces and the Communist 
partisans in Yugoslavia may become a matter of 
serious concern • • • • 
He added that: 
• • • certain British circles have become 
mistrustful of Mihajlovic [Mihailovic] and tolerant 
of the partisan faction.15 
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The British had by the summer of 1942 begun to 
/ 
reevaluate Mihailovic. They had not dropped their support 
for him, but began to gather evidence about his inactivity 
and political leanings. These have been accurately 
described as "Pan Serb." From inside Yugoslavia, Hudson 
sent a message to the Foreign Office on September 6, 1942, 
~ 
stating that Mihailovic had not fought the Germans since 
December 1941 and that it appeared that the Partisans were 
16 
far more important in the war effort in Yugoslavia. The 
British had also noticed through their study of Axis press 
releases the paucity of information on Mihailovic compared 
with frequent mention of Communist activities. However, 
Francis Biddle, Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in 
Exile, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on October 
7, 1942, writing that 
neither Yugoslav circles nor I know of any British 
circles who have become either tolerant of the 
'Partisan' faction or mistrustful of Mihailovic.17 
Biddle also wrote messages describing the lack of unity 
in the Yugoslav Government in Exile. He was worried about 
the internal frictions that were expanding between the 
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Croats and Serbs.* He believed that post-war unity was in 
jeopardy and felt that the Serbs could not liberalize their 
views and create a Yugoslavia of equal opportunity for all 
18 
ethnic groups. Biddle became increasingly concerned about 
Yugoslav politics and described the King as being surrounded 
by politicians from a different world who allowed the King 
19 
very little leeway in liberalizing Yugoslav polity. 
The Secretary of State instructed Biddle on December 
30, 1942, that he should continue to encourage unity within 
the Yugoslav government. Hull wrote that "The disputes 
between the Serb and Croatian elements in the United States 
. 20 
have had a deplorable effect on our national unity." He 
was worried because the issue had begun to spread from just 
the Yugoslav-Americans to the general public. The feeling 
at the State Department was that the Yugoslav Government in 
I 
Exile and its Minister in the United States, Fotic, were 
increasing these problems through lack of a firm and well-
understood policy. The Secretary placed special emphasis on 
Fotic's role as he gained support from the Pan Serb 
* Pre-war Serb-Croat internal problems became worse 
during the war. Croatia was now dominant in Yugoslavia 
and had· infuriated the Serbs through a policy of terrorism 
inside the country. Serbia was subject to a very harsh 
German rule, and the Government in Exile was dominated by 
the Serbs. These Serbs were sure of the Croatian 
atro.cities and considered most Croats traitors. The 
Croats in the Government in Exile thought Serbian charges 
were greatly exaggerated and fought as before the war to 
secure more freedom/power for Croatia. 
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elements. The fact that this had stirred up controversy in 
the American press was also upsetting. 
Regardless of American misgivings, on December 31, 
• I 1942, the State Department sent Ambassador Fotic a message, 
signed by Sumner Welles, which once again reaffirmed 
official American support for Mihailovid. It described 
,,, 
Mihailovic as a skillful and energetic Yugoslav patriot who 
continued the "noble struggle" against Yugoslavia's 
21 
oppressors. 
Walter Roberts summed up the American position in 
Yugoslavia at the end of 1942 in a very succinct manner. 
For the United States, Yugoslavia was at that time 
a distant country, the geography of which had only 
a limited significance in the pursuit of the war. 
America regretted the existence of a civil war, 
and since it recognized the Yugoslav-Government-in-
Exile as the only legal government, it felt duly 
bound to support it and its commander in 
Yugoslavia, General Mihailovic.22 
CHAPTER IV 
1943 
On January 1, 1943, the United States government, 
through its European Field Commander, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, sent a note to General Mihailovid. This note 
followed a recommendation sent by the Secretary of State to 
Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War.* In it, Eisenhower 
congratulated and praised Mihailovic' and called Mihailovib 1 s 
soldiers "immortal warriors" who "serve the common cause of 
the United Nations." He also wished his Yugoslav comrades 
1 
in arms "every success." This was the first direct message 
2 
between the American government and Mihailovid. 
Although the United States government started 1943 by 
/ 
its direct recognition of Mihailovic, American actions in 
Yugoslavia continued on their rather silent course as 
established in 1942. The United States continued to learn 
or hear of events inside Yugoslavia from secondary sources, 
* Hull requested that this be done because the United States had never directly recognized Mihailovid. They 
felt it would be most appropriate if it were handled 
through military channels, especially since the British 
had already accomplished this. See FROS '41, vol II, 
p.840. 
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as before these sources were the British and the Yugoslav 
governments. The State Department was concerned with what 
the British were doing in Yugoslavia, and the Department 
became increasingly concerned about the Yugoslav civil war. 
Yugoslav events became better known in general in the United 
States, and this created controversy regarding the actual 
leaders of the resistance in Yugoslavia. The Partisans 
became more important, and support for them and critiques of 
. . . *' M1ha1lov1c flared up in the American press. The press 
became more literate about events in Yugoslavia, and papers 
like the Daily Worker became impressed with the Partisans. 
The most significant American move came in the summer of 
1943 when American liaison officers were sent to both the 
v 
Cetniks (August 18) and the Partisans (August 22). Thus, 
direct American involvement in Yugoslavia was established 
for he first time since May 16, 1941. 
The importance of British policy in Yugoslavia cannot 
be underrated, especially compared with American lack of 
activity. First, as previously described, the British began 
~ 
to lose enthusiasm for Mihailovic as they gained respect for 
the Partisans. The British missions in the field had 
relayed as frequently as possible their findings to London. 
Wheeler wrote: "During the first third of 1943, the 
Partisans won the Yugoslav civil war and the British decided 
3 
to contact and assist them." 
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Churchill himself began to get reinvolved in Yugoslav 
affairs at this time. He held a dinner party for King 
Peter and his mother in December of 1942, and matters 
concerning the resistance of Yugoslavia were discussed. Two 
days later Eden would dine with the King and the Queen 
,, 
mother, and direct hints about Mihailovic's failures were 
4 
brought forth. This led, on January 3, 1943, the Yugoslav 
Prime Minister, who was changing his cabinet, to ask the 
/ 
British whether they still supported Mihailovic. Slobodan 
Jovanovic, Yugoslav Premier, was told that there was at this 
5 , 
time no reason to remove Mihailovic. 
The British decided in February to send their first 
missions to the Partisans. These missions parachuted into 
areas of suspected Partisan activity, and on May 28, 1943, 
Captain F. w. Deakin was taken to Partisan headquarters 
where he met Tito. Deakin's mission, codenamed "Typical," 
was the most important. He was a personal friend of 
Churchill, and his reports would carry great weight in 
London. His arrival during heavy fighting between the 
Partisans and the Germans led Deakin to assert firmly that 
the Partisans were a centrally-organized and well-led force 
6 
which should be deemed worthy of British support. 
Deakin, himself, wrote in The Embattled Mountain that 
by July 1943, the Prime Minister had 
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by personal intervention • • • determined • • • the 
forces of Tito now emerged as the leading movement 
of resistance in an area in which he was acquiring 
an immediate and strategic interest."7 
Churchill wrote: 
There was much to be said for supporting Tito, who 
was holding a number of German divisions and doing 
much more for the Allied cause than the Chetniks 
[Cetniks] under Mihailovic.8 
The Chiefs of Staff reported to Churchill on June 6, 
1943, that Mihailovi~ had been "hopelessly compromised." 
They stated that clear information to the War Office (from 
the growing number of British soldiers within Yugoslavia) 
had shown Mihailovicto be a collaborationist in both 
Hercegovinia and Montenegro. There was no question that it 
v 
was the Partisans and not the Cetniks who had been occupying 
9 
the activities of the Axis. The Foreign Office also 
/ 
determined that Mihailovic was too "anti-Communist, anti-
Moslem, and anti-Croat" to be of any use in helping settle 
10 
political issues in postwar Yugoslavia. Churchill termed 
Mihailovi~a "major obstacle" and was determined to persuade 
the King to remove him as Minister of War. Churchill ordered 
I 
the withdraw! of his missions operating in Mihailovic's 
territory and the removal of official support for him by the 
11 
British government in December of 1943. 
Churchill wrote that it had become apparent that the 
12 
Partisans were the future rulers of Yugoslavia. He 
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therefore sent a message to the Foreign Secretary on 
December 9, 1943, outlining British policy for Yugoslavia. 
He wanted first 
the immediate repudiation of Mihailovic by His 
Majesty's government and if possible King Peter 
• • • and to explore what advantage may be gained 
for the King from the new situation that will be 
created upon his dismissal of Mihailovic.13 
Churchill concluded that the King's chances of retaining his 
throne were greatly enhanced by having Mihailovicremoved. 
To almost all of these events the American government 
was little more than a concerned observer. Even when 
American liaison officers were finally in the field " • 
it was clear, however, that the British were the senior 
14 
partners in this enterprise." Regardless of this 
situation, the United States became more involved in 
Yugoslavia throughout 1943. 
The immediate concerns of the State Department in 
January of 1943 were the problems of one Yugoslav government 
and of the growing civil war within the country. Biddle 
wrote the Secretary of State several times in January 
describing his discussions with various Yugoslav 
politicians. Biddle stated that the Yugoslav cabinet was in 
a crisis over the political direction or lack of direction 
it gave MihailoviC: He also was quick to point out that 
Croat/U~ta~a atrocities against the Serbs allowed for little 
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flexibility among the various factions of the Yugoslav 
15 
government. This inflexibility led to Nin~ic's removal as 
Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister's assuming this role 
also. 
On January 2, 1943, Jovanovic and Biddle discussed 
Yugoslav-American relations, and Biddle told " ••• that the 
most important point to stress, both for the government here 
[London] and for the Embassy in the United States, was the 
16 
establishment of unity." Biddle also told Jovanovi6 that 
there was nothing the American government could do 
concerning the growing attacks against Mihailovi6 by various 
sectors of the American press. 
H. Freeman Matthews, American Charge in the United 
Kingdom, wrote the Secretary of State on February 24, 1943, 
from London concerning British policy in Yugoslavia. 
Matthews reiterated the British support for Mihailovid; 
however, he also pointed out some of the British 
government's misgivings. He reported that the British had, 
in fact, sent very little aid to Mihailovici and that their 
I 
agents inside Yugoslavia had reported Mihailovic's lack of 
aggressiveness against his country's invaders. Matthews 
v 
also reported that the Cetniks were reported to have 
attacked the Partisans, and finally that the British 
government had decided to contact the Partisans. This was 
in line with the British policy of aiding anyone willing to 
17 
fight the Axis. 
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By the end of March 1943, the American government 
received a clear indication of growing British uneasiness 
with Mihailovic. The Foreign Office showed Biddle a note it 
was sending to the Yugoslav government concerning 
Mihailovic. The British had been offended by a recent 
speech of Mihailovic's, which accused them of holding the 
Yugoslav government prisoner. He also said that he would 
fight the Germans but not until he had dealt with the 
v ~ Ustase, Croats, and Moslems. The Americans also wrote that 
the Yugoslav government was now split among the two Serbian 
factions: Pan Serb and and Pan Yugoslav. It was hoped 
18 
again that the Yugoslavs would soon form a united front. 
On April 16, 1943, the Yugoslav Embassy sent a long 
message to the State Department. This was another in a 
series of messages in which the Yugoslav Government in Exile 
, 
defended itself and the actions of General Mihailovic. It 
was a brief historical sketch of events in war-ravaged 
Yugoslavia and an attack against the Communists within the 
country. It is most interesting because it is the first 
time the name Tito is found in State Department records. He 
is described by the Yugoslav government as "purely or partly 
19 
foreign." Thus, the name Tito is introduced in State 
*Tito was, in fact, born in Croatia to a Croatian father and 
a Slovenian mother. His real name was Josip Broz, but 
Tito became recognized as part of his name. He was 
officially known as Josip Broz Tito. 
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Department files by a foreign-authored note months after 
British representatives had held face-to-face talks with 
him. 
Yugoslavia was not a topic of much discussion in the 
popular press, although as previously mentioned, it became a 
heated topic in various ethnic newspapers within the United 
States. By early 1943, the Yugoslav civil war had made its 
appearance in the mainstream press, and issues concerning 
Yugoslavia gained some importance. c. L. Sulzberger wrote 
about "the necessity of cleaning up the dreary Yugoslav 
20 
situation as soon as possible." The New York Times 
published an editorial on February 5, 1943, discussing the 
increasing resistance efforts inside Yugoslavia. It termed 
Yugoslavia the most "open" and " dangerous" of Hitler's 
territories. The paper was distressed by Yugoslavia's lack 
of internal cohesion and wrote that the two resistance 
groups were receiving support from different groups. It was 
stated that the Russians were supporting the Partisans, and 
the Yugoslav Government in Exile the C~tniks. 
New York City once again began holding events of 
importance in support of Yugoslavia. Mayor Fiorello H. 
LaGuardia, a former American Consul in Yugoslavia, headed a 
major event sponsored to bring about Yugoslav unity. Held 
at the Metropolitan Opera House, it featured Zinka Kunc 
Milanov, a Croat, in the leading role of Aida. Milanov was 
married to a Serb, and a Yugoslav Victory Rally was held at 
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intermission and broadcast over a nationwide radio network. 
Other events including inter-faith religious services were 
also held throughout the country in honor of Yugoslavia's 
resistance. 
Ambassador Fotic met with President Roosevelt on May 5, 
1943, after his return from London. Foti6 wrote that 
/ Roosevelt said he had not been influenced by anti-Mihailovic 
propaganda and wanted to know what he could do to help 
Yugoslavia and prevent the spread of the Yugoslav civil war. 
The President was reported to be excited about Italy's 
approaching def eat and the growing importance of the 
guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia. Foti6 wrote that he felt 
the United States should send officers into Yugoslavia to 
21 
observe events there for themselves. 
Roosevelt has been quoted during the early part of 1943 
as wondering whether Yugoslavia should return to its pre-war 
boundaries following the war's conclusion. He speculated to 
Foti~ that if the Croats would be retained in Yugoslavia 
after the war, " ••• the Croats had taken a way different 
from that of the Serbs, and their future appeared to him to 
22 
be 'cloudy'." Roberts stated that Roosevelt had 
expressed much the same thought to British Foreign Secretary 
Eden on March 14, 1943. 
• • • The President expressed his oft-repeated 
opinion that the Croats and Serbs had nothing in 
common and that it is ridiculous to try to force 
two such antagonistic peoples to live together 
23 
under one government. 
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The State Department appeared not to put much credence 
in Roosevelt's pronouncements, and these statements were not 
found in the Foreign Relations of the United States. The 
Department did write a long memorandum on Yugoslav affairs 
on May 1. Its author was Cavendish w. Cannon, Head of the 
Division of European Affairs. Cannon covered what he 
believed to be a summation of American knowledge of 
Yugoslavia at this time. His first few points were 
regarding Mihailovic, whose exploits he termed as greatly 
exaggerated. He also remarked that he had, in fact, been 
doing very little fighting and probably had been cooperating 
with the Italians against the Partisans, but that there was 
no concrete evidence of collaboration with the Germans. The 
memorandum stated that the British officers with Mihailovic 
were at odds with him and probably were not objective in 
their reports. It was also noted that Britain controlled 
Mihailovib's communications and that he had received very 
few supplies from them. 
The Partisans, Cannon wrote, had been having a tough 
time recently and were probably not as dominated by the 
Communists as the State Department previously thought. He 
also reported that the Soviet government was still denying 
any influence or control of the Partisans, that Partisan 
attempts at forming governments had been a failure and that 
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~ Mihailovic must also have political elements with him, but 
these were unknown (although he wrote that they must have 
24 
been established to counter the Partisans). 
The State Department was asked by the British in mid-
May whether the United States would be interested in sending 
American officers into Yugoslavia. Cannon wrote that the 
Department had not been interested when Foti6 had suggested 
this, but it might be different now. However, the Department 
recommended against sending any Americans at that time. 
Cannon believed advantages could be gained by this move, but 
25 
that the United States should wait. It was believed that 
Americans in Yugoslavia would enable the State Department to 
more efficiently interpret Yugoslav events. 
On July 6, 1943, the British Embassy in Washington sent 
an "Aide Memoire" to the Department of State. This was an 
official announcement that the British had decided to give 
qualified aid to the Partisans as well as its continuation 
to General Mihailovic. 
The summer of 1943 brought two important events in 
American consideration of Yugoslavia. The first was the 
arrival of American liaison officers in Yugoslavia in 
August. An American officer was attached to Mihailovic on 
August 18, and four days later an American officer reached 
Partisan headquarters. The United States had its first 
official representatives in Yugoslavia since May 1941. The 
second event was the surrender of Italy on September 8, 
64 
1943. 
The Italian surrender had been expected by both sides 
and led to actions by all the parties within Yugoslavia. 
v 
The Partisans and Cetniks disarmed as many Italian soliders 
as possible, with the Partisans gaining substantial material 
reinforcements and territorial gains. The Germans were 
forced to send additional troops into Yugoslavia to try to 
fill the gap left by the Italians. The Germans spent the 
next several months recapturing the Adriatic coast from the 
Partisans, but the number of Axis troops and their 
effectiveness were not as great as before the Italian 
surrender. 
The major diplomatic question concerning the Italian 
defeat had already been broached by the Yugoslav Foreign 
~inister, Milan Grol, in July. Grol requested that 
Yugoslavia be allowed to incorporate former Italian enclaves 
26 
on the Yugoslav Adriatic coast into Yugoslavia. The State 
Department took note of this request, but maintained the 
American policy of not giving territorial concessions until 
after the end of hostilities. 
In October 1943, the first American correspondent 
reached Yugoslavia. This was Associated Press' Daniel De 
Luce, who was quick to report on American aid being shipped 
into Yugoslavia from Italy. He reported direct American 
involvement as well as the treatment of thousands of 
27 
Partisan wounded in American hospitals in Italy. 
65 
The fall of 1943 saw Yugoslavia return as an important 
topic in the American press. Papers were now more familiar 
with the Yugoslav civil war, and Tito began to supplant 
Mihailovic as the most frequently cited and important leader 
of the resistance in Yugoslavia. De Luce reported on 
October 9 that he "found not one scrap of evidence of 
28 
Partisan terror. The New York Times wrote that the 
fighting was very confused but that the civil war was not as 
29 
serious as previously thought. This paper, in an 
editorial on October 20, asked the development of an 
American policy for Yugoslavia and wrote about the necessity 
30 
for unifying the resistance movements there. Tito was 
cited by The New York Times for his heavy fighting and 
contrasted with the lack of effort made by Mihailovic. 
Mihailovi6 1 s activity was termed as "somewhat puzzling." 
c. L. Sulzberger wrote that Mihailovic had reported 
31 
capturing the southern Yugoslav part of Boka Kotorska. He 
also reported that he had been unable to find anything to 
~ 
substantiate Mihailovic's claim. This report was one of the 
first written by a non-ethnic writer in America questioning 
the abilities and accomplishments of Mihailovic. Sulzberger 
also wrote that the Yugoslav civil war between Mihailovic 
32 
and Tito was "expanding." 
As previously stated, the American military was now 
becoming active in Yugoslavia. The Office of Strategic 
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Services (OSS) had started shipping large quantities of 
supplies from Bari, Italy into Yugoslavia over the Adriatic 
on October 15. It shipped over 6,000 tons of supplies and 
brought over 12,000 Partisan wounded to hospitals in Italy 
33 
during October. This support would continue for the 
remainder of the war. 
Major Linn M. Farish, United States Army, sent his 
first report as American Liaison Officer to the Partisans 
out of the country on October 29, 1943. His report was the 
first from an American in an official position in Yugoslavia 
in over two years. Farish wrote that "the Partisan movement 
is of far greater military and political importance than is 
commonly realized in the outside world." He also wrote that 
the Partisans had created their position with virtually no 
outside assistance and that, although Communist-led, it was 
not totally dominated by them. Farish believed that all 
members of the Partisans should be allowed to express their 
views and that it was a democratic organization. He wrote 
~ 
that he had seen with his own eyes Cetnik attacks on the 
Partisans and was very adamant in considering Mihailovic 
politically and militarily irresponsible. Finally, Farish 
asked for much greater aid for the Partisans, whom he 
characterized as carrying on a struggle "at times beyond 
34 
imagination." 
Two political events of major importance to 
Yugoslavia occurred in November. The first was the Tehran 
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Conference of November 27 through December 2, 1943. This 
meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin was to establish 
strategic plans for the defeat of Germany1 and Yugoslavia 
was not infrequently mentioned. Although not of much 
significance in the global context, the "Big Three" had 
decided to give additional support to the Balkans. Stalin 
stated that he believed too much emphasis was being placed 
on Yugoslavia and that the number of Axis divisions being 
tied up by Yugoslav guerillas was greatly exaggerated. He 
also said of Yugoslavia "the Soviets do not think, however, 
35 
that this is an important matter." 
The second major political event was held by the 
Partisans inside Yugoslavia at Jajce on November 29. This 
conference outlined Partisan political views and goals. The 
most important of these were: the unilateral transfer of 
power from the Yugoslav Government in Exile to the National 
Committee of Liberation (the political arm of the 
Partisans)1 the exclusion of King Peter from Yugoslavia 
until the people expressed their wishes1 and the appointment 
of Tito as Marshal of Yugoslavia. No American was present 
at this meeting, and it would be some time before it was to 
create a stir in Yugoslavia's international position. 
The United States learned of the events in Jajce from 
its Ambassador in the Soviet Union, w. Averill Harriman, who 
sent an outline of events to the Secretary of State on 
December 14. Harriman received his information from a 
68 
Soviet government agency, which also announced that the 
Soviet Union would soon be sending a military mission to 
36 
Partisan headquarters. A more complete description of the 
"Jajce Declaration" was sent by the new Ambassador to the 
Yugoslav Government in Exile, Lincoln MacVeagh (appointed on 
November 12) on December 28, 1943. The American Ambassador 
in the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, reported that the 
British government had now put a halt to any policy 
decisions regarding Yugoslavia as a direct result of the 
37 
Jajce Declaration. The British were about ready to ask 
King Peter to drop Mihailovic from his cabinet, but this was 
now temporarily blocked. 
The Secretary of State gave MacVeagh instructions 
regarding how he should handle the events following the 
Jayce Declaration. Hull wrote that the resistance movements 
were of "undoubled military value", that they should 
continue to expand their energies in the war against the 
Germans, and that the United States would not enter into any 
political discussions with them. He finished his 
instructions by writing "In line with our consistent policy, 
we consider that political arrangements are primarily a 
38 
matter for future choice of the Yugoslav people." These 
statements of Hull's were also published in the American 
press. 
Louis Adamic, leader of the United Committee of South 
Slavic Americans and a member of the American Slav Congress, 
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came out publicly for strong support by the United States 
for Tito. He asked for immediate recognition of Tito's 
39 
provisional government. He also reported that he believed 
that the Government in Exile was pro-Fascist and did not 
deserve American support. For these statements, Adamic and 
the organizations he represented were labeled Communist 
40 
fronts. Events that were previously reserved for the 
Yugoslav foreign language press within the United States had 
been entering the popular press for months. Ruth Mitchell, 
sister of Air Force General William "Billy" Mitchell, had 
written in July about the anti-Serb and Mihailovic press. 
She wrote that it was the Communists and Croats who were 
41 
defaming Mihailovi~ and his efforts. 
1943 ended with the Americans once again involved with 
Yugoslavia. Although the United States was not as active as 
Great Britain, it did begin to learn first-hand about 
Yugoslav events. The American people also began to read and 
hear about events in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was once again 
described as fighting in the mainstream of the war. Tito 
and his Partisans were described most favorably on December 
22, 1943, in an editorial in The New York Times. 
It is an epic deal of heroism and daring, of 
sacrifice, suffering and death, which place it on a 
level with the most heroic chapters of this war.42 
The United States had sent its first liaison mission 
into Yugoslavia during 1943 and had also recognized the 
70 
importance of Tito and the Partisans. The United States 
would help Tito for military reasons, but would not discuss 




1944 was much like 1943 in that events concerning 
Yugoslavia were dominated by the British. The British led 
sometimes with Russian concurrence, and the Americans 
formulated their stance on Yugoslav issues by the actions of 
the other powers, but usually in reaction to the British. 
However, American knowledge of Yugoslav events was greater 
now~ and through the press, the American public was kept 
constantly informed of British machinations regarding 
Yugoslav politics. The three most important events in 
Yugoslav affairs at this time, outside the military sphere, 
were dominated by the British. 
The first event was the return of King Peter and his 
Government in Exile from Cairo to London. It was also 
I 
responsible for the eventual dismissal of the Puric 
' government (along with its Minister of Defense Mihailovic) 
and the establishment pf the new government headed by the 
f f C . "' ..,, " ormer Ban o roat1a, Dr Ivan Subasic. The second event 
was the removal of military missions from Mihailovid, both 
V' I 
·British and American. The third event was the Tito-Subasic 
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Agreement of November 1. The United States played little 
role in events one and three, and simply followed the 
British military mission out of Mihailovic's headquarters. 
The United States would, however, keep an American officer 
~ 
with Mihailovic, but only as an intelligence mission and not 
an official military representative of the American 
government. 
Churchill himself wrote Tito in response to a get-well 
message he had received from him. Churchill had been 
cautioned by the Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, 
that personal correspondence with Tito might not be a good 
idea, but Churchill's first letter to Tito was sent on 
January 8, 1944. In response to Eden's caution, Churchill 
wrote: 
I have been convinced by the arguments of men I 
know and trust Mihailovic [ 1 ] is a millstone tied 
around the neck of the little King, and he has no 
chance till he gets rid of him.1 
Churchill wrote Tito that 
I am resolved that the British government shall 
give no further military support to Mihailovic ['] 
and will only give help to you.2 
He also wrote that he considered it a good idea for the 
I Royal Yugoslav government to dismiss Mihailovic from its 
Cabinet. Churchill wrote favorably about the King and 
stated that British relations with him would be maintained. 
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Churchill, of course, flattered Tito on his "valiant effort" 
and the hope that all the resistance forces in Yugoslavia 
would soon be united. The Prime Minister added that his 
son would soon be joining Tito in the field. 
The King, who had been staying with his government, 
flew back to London in early March for a series of meetings 
and political discussions with the British. Churchill had 
by this time continued his correspondence with Tito. He 
wrote him again on February 5. He told Tito that he could 
understand his lack of enthusiasm for the King, but that he 
was personally responsible and wished to have the King 
dismiss Mihailovicfrom his government. Churchill also 
wanted to know what effect the King's dismissal of 
Mihailovic' and his possible return to his homeland would have 
on Tito. Churchill acknowledged that he realized the final 
determination of the monarchy would not be done until the 
final liberation of the country. The Prime Minister also 
wrote that a working arrangement between the King and Tito 
could have significant benefit for Tito and would allow the 
country to speak with a united voice. Churchill ended his 
letter by stating that it was his Britannic Majesty's 
government's desire to unite all patriotic forces behind 
Tito and to help in forming a united and federative 
3 
democracy in Yugoslavia. 
Tito replied to Churchill as in the first letter--with 
very guarded words. Tito would not commit himself to any 
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actions. Churchill again wrote Tito on February 25 and 
repeated his wish for the King to dismiss Mihailovic' and, if 
possible, return to Yugoslavia. 
Churchill also went before the House of Commons on 
February 22 and spoke about the general war situation and 
also about Yugoslavia in particular. During this speech he 
I 
publicly gave his support to Tito and berated Mihailovic for 
"being left alone in certain mountain areas and in return 
4 
doing nothing or very little against the enemy." He 
, 
contrasted Mihailovic with the Partisan's continuous 
struggles against the Germans and told how the Partisans 
were made up of all Yugoslav ethnic groups, unlike the Serb 
~ 
Cetniks. He stated "Of course the Partisans of Marshal Tito 
are the only people doing any effective fighting against the 
Germans now." Churchill also said that every effort was 
being made to aid Tito. In reference to the King, he 
commented: "We cannot dis-associate ourselves in any way 
from him," although he suffers in the eyes of the Partisans 
5 
because of his association with Mihailovi~. 
The State Department closely followed British actions 
in Yugoslavia. However, America remained a bystander and 
waited to see how events would turn. Still much information 
was discussed in relation to American policy towards 
Yugoslavia, but most of it was in response to British 
initiatives. By January 17, 1944, the State Department had 
been informed of the Foreign Office's wish to have 
6 , 
Mihailovic removed from the Yugoslav government. The 
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Americans realized that this would strengthen the King vis-
a-vis his relations with Tito and the Partisans. 
The United States never interfered with British moves, 
but remained cautious and somewhat cynical of them. British 
policy towards Yugoslavia was termed "trial and error," and 
the United States should "not want to commit ourselves to a 
definite stand on the British, at least until we know Tito's 
7 
reaction to the Churchill letter." This came from a State 
Department memorandum of January 19, 1944. This memorandum 
continued at length discussing British reasons for ·dropping 
support for Mihailovic~ It also brought into focus the 
• I probability of the downfall of the Pur1c government that 
I 
would be caused by the King's removal of Mihailovic. 
The memorandum stated: 
••• it would be unfortunate and dangerous for 
this government to become politically involved 
otherwise than in rather general terms with an 
internal situation as difficult as this. 
It continued by pointing out that the United States must act 
in concert with both the British and the Soviets. It stated 
that the Royal Yugoslav governments were dominated by Pan-
Serb "intransigence" and that unless the United States had a 
policy which it wished to work very had to support, it would 
" be best to throw our weight in the direction of the 
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moderate and democratically-minded elements who look to the 
future rather than the past," the conclusion being that 
continued support for Serb-dominated governments appeared 
fruitless, but that there might be other choices than to 
support Tito. 
Ambassador MacVeagh wrote the Secretary of State about 
Churchill's letter to Tito and emphasized Churchill's wish 
I for Mihailovic's removal. MacVeagh also hinted for 
, 
continued American support for Mihailovic. MacVeagh again 
wrote the Secretary of State on February 21, telling him 
that the British would soon remove their liaison officers 
I 
from Mihailovic and that it was recommended that the 
American liaison officers be removed at the same time. At 
, 
this time, the American military mission to Mihailovic 
~onsisted of three officers, with only the most junior, Lt. 
I 
Muselin, still remaining with Mihailovic. The British were 
asking that he be removed as an act of joint British-
American military policy. Muselin would remain with 
Mihailovid, but the other officers were permanently pulled 
out under orders from British General Maitland Wilson, 
8 
Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. Muselin's 
mission, however, was changed; he was no longer a liaison 
officer, but an intelligence officer of "an independent, 
purely intelligence mission composed of a single American 
9 
officer." This action was approved by the State Department 
on March 2, 1944. 
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The Soviet Union began to draw attention to itself with 
respect to Yugoslavia. The Soviets refused to sign a treaty 
with the Royal Yugoslav Government during January 1944. The 
New York Times wrote on February 6, that the Soviet Union 
favored Tito and the National Liberation Movement. It also 
wrote that Mihailovi~was termed a "pro-Fascist" by the 
Soviets. They printed the Soviet response to the proposed 
treaty with Yugoslavia. The Soviets stated that " ••• the 
uncertainty of the situation in Yugoslavia" prvented them 
from signing any treaty. The Soviety Military Mission 
finally arrived at Tito's headquarters on February 23, 1944. 
The Soviets had announced at the Tehran Conference that they 
would be sending such a mission. The Russian mission was 
much larger than the British and American missions combined 
and carried a more prestigious officer at its head, Lt. 
General N. V. Korneyev. 
Stettinius wrote a memorandum from London in which he 
placed much emphasis on the Russians. He wrote: 
The important factor in the Yugoslav situation 
today is not so much the Tito-Mihailovic-Cairo 
conflict as the interplay of Soviet and British 
policy in question.10 
He wrote that the Soviet Union had continued to attack 
Mihailovic and was openly pro-Tito. However, it was 
maintaining proper relations with respect to the King. He 
was also pointed out that Tito had received no military aid 
78 
from the Soviets that the Americans knew of. Stettinius 
ended his brief discussion of the Soviets by adding that 
they "have thus far kept formally correct relations with the 
11 
Government in Exile." 
The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, MacVeagh, had 
12 
already termed Churchill's policy as "pro-Tito" 
Stettinius wrote from London about what he thought the 
British were trying to accomplish in their current talks 
I 
with the King and Prime Minister Puric. He wrote that 
Churchill had added his "immense personal prestige" to the 
side of Tito. He pointed out how he was corresponding with 
him directly; he also pointed out the fact that his son was 
now assigned to Tito's headquarters. Stettinius wrote that 
the political discussions then occurring in London were to 
change the makeup of the Yugoslav government--that the King 
, , 
would still be its leader, but that Mihailovic and Puric 
would be dropped to allow elements of the Partisans to form 
a united government. He also accused the British of 
competing with the Russians for Yugoslavia's favor while 
describing the Russians as only mildly interested in 
Yugoslav events. 
In closing, Stettinius summarized the official American 
position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. He indicated that America 
would continue to send aid to Tito for military purposes and 
that our rcognition of the Government in Exile would 
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continue, although he noted its weaknesses. He said that we 
would maintain a liaison mission with Tito and a single-
member intelligence mission with Mihailovic!. He also said 
that Tito was trying to acquire the frozen Yugoslav assets 
in America, which would not be available to him without 
political recognition. He concluded that the United States 
would continued.to deal with any orderly, established 
13 
Yugoslav government. 
News of America's lack of activity in Yugoslavia was 
published in The New York Times editorial of May 1, 1944. 
The paper described American policy as adhering to the 
Atlantic Charter, while leaving policy determination in the 
Balkans to the British. The editorial accused the British 
of creating a political vacuum and of aiding the rise of 
Marshal Tito. c. L. Sulzberger, a writer for The New York 
Times and son of the publisher, wrote that "the State 
Department has made it clear more than once that in any type 
of active diplomacy, the Eastern Mediterranean remain 
14 
essentially a British sphere of interest." 
Regardless of American activity or lack of it, the King 
and his Prime Minister, Puric', were still in London holding 
meetings with Churchill and lesser members of the British 
government. The King was being urged to form a new 
government, one that would give him some leeway with the 
Partisans. Churchill was losing patience as both Puric' and 
the King refused to dismiss Mihailovid and form a new 
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government. Churchill wrote Eden "Unless he [King Peter] 
acts promptly, as the sense of your minutes indicates, his 
chance of regaining his throne, in my opinion, will be 
15 
lost." King Peter wrote that he had tried to convince 
Churhill that to support Tito would mean a Communist 
Yugoslavia. Peter wrote that Churchill was only interested 
in·defeating the "Hun." He stated that he was being pushed 
to the utmost limit to remove the Puri~ government. Peter 
reported that he was being pushed by Churchill to accept Dr. 
Ivan Subasic as his new Prime Minister, a man he was assured 
by Churchill would be loyal to him. The King wrote 
Roosevelt in hopes of obtaining American assistance for his 
16 
position, but Roosevelt made no attempt to aid him. 
The American Ambassador to Great Britain, John. G. 
Winant, wrote the Secretary of State. He described the 
tremendous pressure being applied to Peter to rid himself of 
his government. He discussed Britain's policy as coming for 
the short run military victory and therefore unable to 
support Mihailovi~. He finished by saying that the new 
government would be a "stop-gap" arrangement for the period 
17 
of the war. 
Roosevelt's reply to the above-mentioned request for 
assistance from the King was sent on May 12. Roosevelt 
wrote that he found that the King's advisers were not 
telling him of the true nature of events in Yugoslavia: 
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that the Royal Government was not popular and was becoming 
less so as time went on. He also suggested that Mihailovid 
should be removed from the government for political reasons, 
but should be allowed to remain as a soldier in the field. 
Roosevelt also pointed out that contrary to what he had been 
told, the Partisans had larger forces and far greater 
strength in the country than the King's ministers led him to
18 
believe. It is interesting to note that within a few days
of the above-mentioned letter Roosevelt actually wrote a 
letter to Tito, but it is unknown whether this letter was 
sent and it was not sent in any case as a direct message 
19 
between Roosevelt and Tito. 
The Yugoslav government of Prime Minister Puric'was 
dismissed by the King on May 24. This event had been 
previously announced by Churchill in a letter to Tito 
20 
written on May 17. Tito received the following message 
from Churchill on May 24: 
The King has sacked Puric and Company, and I think 
the Ban of Croatia [Subasic] will rally a certain 
force round him. My idea is that this government 
should lie quiet for a bit and let events flow on 
their course. This, I think, was rather in accord 
with your idea in the first telegrams exchanged.21 
22 
Both King Peter in his memoirs A King's Heritage and 
23 
Constantin Fotic1 in his book The War We Lost 
-----
attributed the downfall of the Puri~ government to the 
British, and to Churchill in particular. 
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A new government was appointed by King Peter on June 1. 
v , 
The head of this government was Dr Ivan Subasic, former 
"Ban" (Governor) of Croatia and the number two man in the 
Crotian Peasant Party, behind Vlado Macek. Subasic had been 
living in the United States since November 1941 and was 
called to London by the King at the urging of Churchill. 
y y ~ 
Subasic had spoken out in the United States against 
; 
Mihailovic and the Government in Exile and for Marshal 
24 
Tito. Although a Croat, he was not alone in these 
pronouncements. General Du~an Simovic, leader of the 
Yugoslav coup d'etat had also publicly renounced the Royal 
25 
Government and endorsed Tito. 
Cavendish Cannon, Assistant Chief, Division of Southern 
Europe Affairs, summarized American policy towards 
Y?goslavia on May 19, 1944. He opined that Yugoslavia 
should be maintained in its entirety. He stressed that the 
United States would not interfere in internal Yugoslav 
affairs and had no special interests in Yugoslavia. He also 
wrote that there was no resistance group within Yugoslavia 
that represented all the people and that the United States 
would not form a policy to work with any particular group. 
He also stressed that both Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union had special interests in the area. He stated that 
those governments' interests were being "implemented so 
dynamically that the effect is hardly consistent with our 
doctrine of non-intervention." He concluded by adding that 
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Yugoslav-Americans would help Yugoslavia rebuild, but were 
26 
not spokesmen for American opinion on Yugoslav issues. 
The spring and summer of 1944 showed vividly the 
changes that had occurred in Europe since Germany's 
successes of the early war period. The British and 
Americans had cleared North Africa of the Germans1 their 
armies were advancing north in Italy, capturing Rome on June 
41 and the Allied second front had been established in 
northwest Europe on June 6 in Normandy, France. The Soviets 
had pushed the German armies hundreds of miles westward and 
would enter Poland in August. It had become apparent that 
Germany would be defeated. 
To a lesser extent, events in Yugoslavia were no less 
dynamic. Although Yugoslavia had quickly succumbed to 
Germany, it was not slow in organiz!ng resistance against 
its foreign occupiers. By the summer of 1944, Tito and the 
Partisans had been recognized as the main resistance 
elements in the country, and the Tehran Conference aid had 
been given almost exclusively to them. Political events had 
also reached a stage where the main players were now 
recognized and in position to complete a new regime in 
Yugoslavia. 
The United States had recognized its lack of major 
interest in Yugoslavia and had also admitted that Great 
Britain and the Soviet Unio~ had important stakes in 
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Yugoslavia and the eastern Mediterranean. American policy 
had almost always followed the British lead. The Americans 
I 
moved in their liaison missions to Tito and Mihailovic after 
the British, but did leave an intelligence mission with 
Mihailovi~ after both liaison missions had been removed, 
again after the British lead. The British had handled the 
majority of the political actions with the Government in 
Exile, and it would be very hard to argue with Churchill 
when he wrote Roosevelt on June 23, 1943 that Britain had 
n 
• informed the United States at every stage of how we 
are bearing this heavy burden [Yugoslavia] which at present 
27 
rests mainly on us." 
In June 1944, the British presented a plan for uniting 
all the nationalist factions in Yugoslavia. The British 
sponsored a meeting between Tito and the Yugoslav Premier in 
~ v / London, Subasic. The United States was not participating in 
the British proposals and was waiting on the sidelines to 
try to judge how the political situation would develop. On 
June 17, 1944, the Secretary of State wrote that the State 
Department had no direct contact with Subasi~ and that 
virtually all his information came from British sources. He 
believed that extreme caution was necessary when viewing any 
information from non-American sources, that neither the 
Department nor the OSS had any fresh information about 
28 
political or military happenings in Yugoslavia. 
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The New York Times was quicker to judge the events then 
occurring. c. Daniel, on June 2, 1944, wrote a story in the 
paper that this was perhaps the last chance the King had for 
saving his throne. He wrote that the King wished to have 
all discussions of the continuation of the monarchy held in 
29 
abeyance until after the liberation of the country. In 
effect, however, the King seemed quite clear that he would 
abide by the wishes of his countrymen. 
The Secretary of State received a message dated June 
30 
11 which described what the Americans then knew about the 
British plan. He was told that Tito would become the 
v v ~ 
military commander of all Yugoslav forces and that Subasic 
would have the political and civil authority. The Americans 
believed that because the discussion would take place on the 
Adriatic island of Vis, which was under British control, 
the time seemed excellent for the British to obtain the best 
bargain possible from Tito. The bargain was to be the 
consolidation of the Yugoslav forces to be followed by more 
specific talks on military, economic, and financial matters 
if successful. 
The meeting was already in session when the Secretary 
of State finally received direct information about the 
talks. This information came from the American Consul 
General in Naples, George L. Brandt, who again used 
Murphy's reports and was dispatched June 18, 1944. On 
June 15, Tito was given a letter written by Churchill 
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emphasizing the importance of the various Yugoslav factions 
working together, in particular those represented by the 
King and Tito. Tito was in fact talking directly with 
Subasic, covering the broad spectrum of Yugoslav political 
affairs, but little of substance was discussed in their 
initial conversations. There was great confidence in the 
belief that Tito and Subasic would come to some political 
understanding, but the subject of the King was ignored by 
Tito. Murphy concluded in his message, sent to the 
Secretary of State from Naples on June 18, that the British 
were confident that cooperation would be achieved between 
v 31 
Tito and Subasic. 
Churchill wrote Roosevelt on June 23 concerning the 
Tito-Subasic talks. He wrote that 
I -have also taken action to try to bring together a 
union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia, and 
with all adhering to the Royal Yugoslav Government, 
which we both have recognized. 
Churchill also wrote that he could not give up on the King, 
but was still supporting his position in Yugoslavia. He 
finished his letter by stating "You have been informed at 
33 
every stage of how we are bearing this heavy burden." 
After these initial discussions were completed, Tito 
was urged to go on to Italy and confer in person with the 
King, and this subject was dropped. It must be pointed out 
that Tito and the King were never to meet. Finally Brandt 
wrote again that Tito would not meet the King and that 
consideration of the monarchy would be deferred until 
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Yugoslavia's liberation. It was also stated that the King 
was expected to approve the Tito Subasi~ talks, regardless 
of the fact that the King believed that one of Tito's 
primary goals was to end the monarchy. 
Arthur H. F. Schoenfeld, Charge to the Yugoslav 
Government in Exile, summarized the situation by once again 
emphasizing that the subject of the King and Monarchy would 
wait, as well as the final organization of the Yugoslav 
State. He also wrote of several other topics. These 
included Tito's command of the Yugoslav Navy and his 
requests for supplies and for a permanent military mission 
in Italy. 
The American position on these talks was finally 
clarified by the Department of State in a message dated July 
4, 1944, addressed to Schoenfeld. He wrote that 
The final goal is to further the cause of national 
unity. No action should be initiated which would 
commit us to recognition of any claims to the 
revision of pre-war frontiers. Such questions must 
be held in abeyance for settlement at the peace 
conference. This means in Yugoslavia that we should 
provide the fullest aid to Tito's Partisans •••• 
We must not become involved in or a party to purely 
internal conflicts or domestic issues in 
Yugoslavia.34 
The Secretary of State received his first concrete 
• V V" • I information on the Tito-Subasic talks from Schoenfeld, on 
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July 5. This note was a copy of a report given to Churchill 
by Subasic. Following are the key excerpts from this 
communication: 
Subasic states that before reaching their 
conclusions, Tito and he agreed to divide their 
future into two phases, the first preparatory and 
the second final ••••• He thinks there will be 
time enough to improve the position of the King, 
and the new government shows themselves [sic] 
prepared to do everything in their power actively 
to help the people and the resisters. Tito will 
then be more outspoken on the matter •••• Subasic 
adds that the recently-concluded agreement has the 
following significance for the King and the 
Government: It signifies first of all recognition· 
by Tito and his anti-Fascist and executive councils 
of the legitimate representatives of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. This recognition is demonstrated by 
the fact that Tito and his national committee have 
discussed and concluded an agreement with the Royal 
Government of Yugoslavia. In addition, Tito and 
his men agree to delegate two persons to the Royal 
Government.35 
According to Schoenfeld, the value of this document to Tito 
and the Partisans was that the King accepted the principle 
of a democratic and federal organization structure for the 
post-war state. 
America agreed with the British objective to aid 
Yugoslav resistance elements, to avoid a civil war, and to 
achieve Yugoslav national unity. The British policy and the 
American policy were virtually identical. However, Hull did 
not agree with all the means by which this "accord" was to 
be implemented. His main argument against it was that it 
was basically an agreement between the British and Tito, 
89 
with SubasiC' acting as a go-between. He viewed it as an 
almost unconditional approval of Partisan demands that would 
most probably be forced on the King. 
It was, however, believed that the appointment of 
Subasic to replace Mihailovi~ as Minister of War paved the 
way for negotiations leading to a reasonable arrangement 
between the various Yugoslav factions. Hull also was upset 
at what he termed the exclusion of Serbian interests in the 
V v I 
negotiations between Tito and Subasic. He stated _that the 
Department was firmly against giving Tito and/or the 
Partisans a free hand in Serbia, and he resented the Allies' 
36 
lack of knowledge concerning the events within Serbia. 
The King somewhat unhappily described Churchill's 
reactions to these talks as " • content and pleased that 
Tito recognized my government and showed willingness to 
37 
cooperate." 
~ v / 
Following Subasic's return to London, the King formed a 
new government, to which Tito sent his personal 
representative. The members of the new government were 
divided equally among the three largest Yugoslav groups--the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes--causing Fotic to complain about 
the lack of Serbian representation. The head of the OSS, 
William Donovan, wrote to the Director of the Office of 
European Affairs, James c. Dunn, describing a discussion 
between Tito and Time/Life correspondent Pribi~evi~. In 
90 
this article, to which Donovan appeared to give credence, 
Pribi~evic described why the Partisans had carried on the 
.,. ., • I discussions between Tito and Subasic. The Partisans and 
Tito believed it was necessary to take these steps to obtain 
the necessary international recognition. The steps were 
unfortunate, but necessary to allow them to change 
the political recognition regarding their status in 
international affairs. 
It was only a few days after the United States learned 
... " ~ 
of the substance of the Tito-Subasic accords that the 
National Committee of Liber.ation renounced the Communist 
representatives sent to London and the Royal Yugoslav 
Government. They did not consider themselves "officially" 
represented in London. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director 
of the Office of European Affairs, wrote to the Secretary of 
State regarding the comments of the National Committee of 
Liberation. In it he pointed out that Tito had shown bad 
faith by announcing the terms of the secret agreement and 
then by allowing almost the entire text to be read on "Free 
Yugoslavia," a radio station in Russia. It was also 
considered poor that after he had named representatives to 
the Royal Yugoslav Government, the National Committee of 
Liberation later repudiated them. Matthews once again 
stressed the Department's belief that Tito should not be 
strengthened at the expense of the Serbs and finally that 
American arms were being used by Tito in the Yugoslav Civil 
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War. Perhaps the final word concerning American 
participation during the recent talks is best summed up by 
Robert Murphy: 
The conversations at Bair and Vis were restricted 
to an Anglo-Yugoslav basis without American 
participation, and no invitation to participate was 
extended to us.40 
Churchill, after corresponding with Tito, met him face 
to face in Italy. Their meeting took place on August 12, 
1949, and Churchill felt that he had an excellent 
opportunity to influence Tito. Churchill hoped to increase 
¥ ~ I 
the cooperation between Tito and Subasic and the King. 
Churchill wrote that at his meeting, "Tito assured me that, 
as he had stated publicly, he had no desire to introduce the 
41 
Communist system into Yugoslavia." Churchill, however, 
was not able to receive any commitments from Tito, but once 
again took the lead in dealing with him. Churchill did 
cable Roosevelt of his talks, but the United States had 
little to do with Tito's stay in Italy. 
As early as August, 1944, American officials were 
already concerning themselves with possible Yugoslav post-war 
claims. These, of course, concerned the regions bordering 
Yugoslavia on the north and northwest, including Venezia, 
Giulia, Trieste, Gorizia, and the Istrian Peninsula. 
Secretary of State Hull pointed out the American position 
regarding border claims in a note sent to Murphy on August 
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26, 1944. In the note, Hull pointed out that it was not the 
policy of the government to recognize any claims, especially 
42 
at this time. 
On September 12, 1944, the same day the American Army 
entered Germany, King Peter issued a communique via radio 
~ ~ , 
giving his views on the recent Tito-Subasic accords. In 
this talk, he urged all Yugoslavs to rally to the National 
Liberation Army under Tito, and he also affirmed his support 
for the talks. Eight days later, the United States 
appointed Richard c. Patterson as the new American 
Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile. Patterson 
remained the American Ambassador until the end of the war 
and became the first American Ambassador to the new 
Yugoslavia. 
Alexander c. Kirk, u. s. Political Advisor on the 
staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theater 
(SACMED), wrote to Washington in late September, 1944, 
concerning the restrictions on American military personnel 
within Partisan-held Yugoslavia. He wrote that this was 
because Tito did not wish the American or British 
representatives to recognize or report on any of the events 
in the Yugoslav civil war. Tito was, in fact, consolidating 
his power at this time. 
Because the war was nearing its conclusion, Tito and 
his supporters were more sure of themselves. Their grip on 
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the country was becoming more firmly established, and Tito 
was using all his influence to channel Western aid to 
Yugoslavia. Tito realized that after the Germans began 
evacuating Greece, which they did on October 7, 1944, 
Yugoslavia's turn was approaching. It also became known 
that Tito had left Yugoslavia and flew secretly to Moscow. 
There he coordinated the activities of the Soviet Army with 
his Partisans for the upcoming sweep through Yugoslavia. 
This trip irritated Churchill, who described the British as 
Tito's protectors. He was particularly upset at not being 
43 
notified in advance of the trip. Tito, by this time, 
openly considered the American intelligence mission at his 
headquarters an abomination. 
·An announcement by Dr. Ivan Ribnikar, President of 
AVNOJ*, was reported immediately by Kirk to Washington. 
Ribnikar was reported as saying that a new federal 
Yugoslavia already existed, both "defacto" and "dejure," 
which had been established the previous November in the 
Jacje Declarations proclaiming AVNOJ. He also reported that 
Ribnikar had said that the Partisans would allow others to 
make peace with them, but no one would be allowed to deny 
them the fruits of their victory. 
* AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation of 
Yugoslavia) was established by Tito in Jajce during 
November 1943. It was to establish and carry out 
political goals for the hitherto military Partisan 
movement. 
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This report was viewed with alarm in Washington, 
because it showed how far Tito wanted to take his power in 
Yugoslavia, and it led American observers to question what 
type of arrangements could be made with him in the future. 
Churchill again became actively involved in Yugoslav 
affairs. 
In a visit to Moscow, October 9-22, 1944, Yugoslavia 
was discussed with Stalin. They divided the Balkans into 
spheres of influence with each country having a 5Q/50 
influence in Yugoslavia. The United States was not a 
participant in these talks and, as Churchill wrote 
Roosevelt, "You may be sure we shall handle everything so as 
44 
not to commit you." Churchill indicated that these were 
only preliminary discussions and that no firm commitments 
would be made. He wrote: 
Concerning Yugoslavia, the numerical symbol 50-50 
is intended to be the foundation of joint action 
and an agreed policy between the two Powers [Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union] now closely involved, 
so as to favor the ~reation of a united Yugoslavia 
after all elements there have been joined together 
to the utmost in driving out the Nazi invaders. It 
is intended to prevent, for instance, armed strife 
between the Croats and Slovenes on the one side and 
powerful and numerous elements in Serbia on the 
other ••• 45 
Churchill also believed that this arrangement afforded the 
British to remain on equal footing with the Russians in 
Yugoslavia. 
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The Americans, as previously mentioned, saw this area as 
one of unique importance to the two powers and reacted 
calmly. Roosevelt had been kept updated by both Ambassador 
Harriman and Churchill of the proceedings in Moscow and 
apparently made little of them. 
On October 27, 1944, Churchill again brought the 
subject of Yugoslavia up in a speech before the House of 
Commons. Churchill was acting again to bring Tito and 
v "" I Subasic together to effect changes in the situation between 
the Royal Yugoslav Government and Tito in Yugoslavia. He 
mentioned that the Russians were joining the British in 
support of these talks, while the Americans once again 
remained on the sidelines. 
Major Charles w. Thayer of the Independent American 
Military Mission to Tito wrote from Belgrade on November 4, 
1944, concerning the Tito-Subasic talks and their 
agreements. This report was of paramount importance because 
it commented on the internal policies that would be followed 
by the two major Yugoslav factions, Marshal Tito's National 
Liberation Front and King Peter's Royal Government. The 
fulfillment of these agreements was to stabilize the 
situation and eventually lead to a permanent Yugoslav 
government, one which the United States must either work 
with or against if it were to deal with post-World War II 
Yugoslavia (see Appendix I for a full copy and attached 
V I 
subagreements of the Tito Subasic Agreement, dated November 
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1, 1944). Thayer pointed out the major weakness of the 
plan--the Regents named by the King must be approved by Tito 
and the new combined cabinet would have a preponderance of 
Tito's people over Subasic's by a 2:1 ratio. 
Before his departure, Maclean stated that he felt 
it was the best that could be hoped for, though he 
readily admitted to its shortcomings, which he said 
he would have to point out to his Prime Minister. 
Since he did not believe anything Great Britain or 
the United States could do would result in a more 
satisfactory document, he was determined to try to 
obtain quick approval by his authorities and King 
Peter. 
Thayer continued in the same correspondence: 
Furthermore, Tito is today the only leader with any 
real power within the country. His following, 
whatever its relative size in proportion to the 
population, is the only organized, armed and active 
group in Yugoslavia. Thus, the new agreement only 
legalized his position as the supreme authority in 
the country. It is believed that he intends to set 
up the sort of government desired by the Anti-
Fascist Council and that the plebiscite will in all 
probability be a 'take it or leave it' proposition 
with no alternative but to express acceptance or 
rejection of the Council's platform. Under these 
conditions, the results are a foregone conclusion.46 
Reactions to the Tito-~ubasic Agreement were not slow 
in forming. Perhaps the most realistic and sanguine 
response to these talks came from Kirk. He saw the 
agreement as a move necessary for Tito and his followers to 
gain international recognition. 
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••• Tito had given barely enough to secure 
continuity and recognition. He would be Prime 
Minister and Subasic merely a subservient link with 
the outside world.47 
The New York Times November 19, 1944, summed up the 
Tito-Subasic Agreement. The paper wrote that this agreement 
~ v ' between Tito and Subasic was greatly assisted by Britain and 
the USSR and finally cleared up years of political turmoil. 
It suggested that Britain was backing the King and would be 
pleased to see him return to the country, while the Soviets 
backed Tito. The King was quoted as saying that he would 
48 
wait for the call of his people before returning. 
The King reacted much differently in private as 
reported by Ambassador Patterson: 
The King replied that he would not sign the 
agreement, for it is tantamount to abdication. The 
King said regency was only a form to gain 
recognition by the United States and Britain. The 
King also made comments about the possibility of 
reorganizing his government and removing himself 
from both Churchill's and Subasic's influence.49 
Tito continued to consolidate and broaden his powers in 
Yugoslavia after the agreement. He announced a full general 
amnesty to the supporters of Mihailovi~ and to members of 
the Regular Croatian Army ("Domobrani"). He also published 
the political make-up of the postwar Yugoslavia. It would 
be a federal state with six republics--Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Montenegro. 
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It was stated that each republic would have its own assembly 
elected by the people following the complete liberation of 
the country. 
Churchill also reacted to this agreement, which he was 
greatly responsible for helping to enact. His infatuation 
with Tito and the Partisans became far less intense, but he 
~ ~ I 
nevertheless continued to support the Tito-Subasic 
Agreement. 
The new Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
finally outlined the official American policy to the Tito-
Subasid Agreement in a telegram to Ambassador Patterson in 
London, dated December 23, 1944. Patterson was told that he 
v v I 
could tell both Subasic and the King that the Department had 
reviewed the documents and concluded that they held in form 
with the principles expressed by the Royal Yugoslav 
Government, both in its political and its war aims. 
However, Stettinius added that the American government would 
have to reserve opinion on the ability of this agreement to 
be fully implemented. It was believed that the 
implementation depended upon the cooperation and respect of 
the Yugoslav two factions for each other. Patterson was 
also told to emphasize that the American government had 
always defended the rights of the Yugoslav peoples to form 
their own government without the suppression of any group 
within the country, and in particular without any foreign 
influence. 
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After saying that the agreement was perhaps too general 
and that knowledge of pertinent subtleties in Yugoslav law 
was not at hand, Stettinius continued: 
For your guidance, it may be added that in the 
event of the King's acceptance of this or any 
compromise agreement, the question of 'recognition' 
by this Government would not arise. Our formal 
relations would not be determined by our appraisal 
of the merits of the arrangement. Should the King 
reject whatever terms may be arrived at, we 
consider it probable that Marshal Tito would 
formally repudiate the Government-in-Exile and 
request recognition of his organization as the 
responsible government. In such circumstances, our 
decision concerning recognition would depend on a 
re-examination of the situation within Yugoslavia, 
followed probably with consultation with other 
governments with regard to the situation then 
prevailing.SO 
1944 came to an end with the political situation in 
Yugoslavia becoming more clear. Tito had continued to 
consolidate his political strength and had been recognized 
by the King as the military leader for the entire country. 
~ v I 
The Tito-Subasic Agreement of November 1, 1944, had given 
both Tito and the Royal Yugoslav Government a chance to work 
together to form a united Yugoslav government. The 
Agreement had tacitly recognized both the power of Tito and 
his followers and their acceptance, at least for the time 
being, of the existence of the monarchy. 
The United States still maintained its ambassador in 
London (Patterson) to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (The 
Royal Yugoslav Government), but had also established direct 
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contacts within Yugoslavia. The American Military Mission 
had arrived in Yugoslavia in August 1943, and by August 
1944, was stationed at Partisan Headquarters at Vis. By 
October, elements of the military mission were over much of 
the country, including Serbia. Stettinius had made it clear 
that the American government found nothing incompatable in 
the points made in the Tito-Subasi~ Agreement, but had been 
sure to point out that its implementation might not be very 
easy. This latter point would be brought into sharp focus 
throughout 1945. First, the King would balk at the 
implementation as he realized what it did to his position. 
And second, it became increasingly difficult to compromise 
--- I 
with Tito. The American government and members of the U.S. 1 
press corps in Europe continually pointed out the lack of 
democracy and the growth of a Communist dictatorship in 
Yugoslavia. The face of internal events in Yugoslavia did 
play an increasingly important role in how outsiders and 
particularly the United States viewed Yugoslavia. The 
internal events in Yugoslavia created problems for the 
American government, causing a long delay in its recognition 
of the Yugoslav government. 
CHAPTER VI 
1945 AND 1946 
The position of the King vis-a-vis Tito within 
Yugoslavia became much more crucial after the King learned 
,,, " , 
of the Tito-Subasic Agreement. King Peter was described by 
both American and British diplomats as being very 
apprehensive concerning his future position. The King was 
very suspicious of AVNOJ and considered it illegal. His 
natural tendencies and those of his advisors were to ignore 
the affairs and to push for the royal powers regardless of 
the position of Tito and his supporters in Yugoslavia. Once 
again the British were dominant in dealing with the 
situation and urged the monarch to come to grips with the 
reality of his position. 
Patterson, in a message to the Secretary of State on 
January 12, 1945, wrote that the King and his Prime Minister 
were at complete odds concerning the Tito-~ubasid Agreement 
and that the Prime Minister had almost resigned from the 
government for what he considered to be the King's 
unconstitutional behavior. The King did, however, agree to 
some of the terms in the Agreement, but wished to clarify 
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his position. The King was in search of a compromise that 
would not allow his fate to be determined almost solely by 
men not in his confidence. 
The King's position was perhaps most accurately 
described in the press. The King was originally against the 
Regency, as he found no constitutional grounds for it under 
current conditions. He was described as not totally opposed 
to the idea of a regency, but wished to add qualifiers to its 
implementation before he would accept it. He had three 
conditions for approving the Regency: first, that he would 
name the regents; second, that the legislative powers of the 
new government be limited until after a constituent assembly 
could be elected; and third, that he, himself, be allowed to 
return. 
The King began to search for a solution to his 
problems; that is, a Regency picked and approved by him and 
the chance to save his throne, as outlined in the Tito-
Subasic Agreement. The Secretary of State once again 
reaffirmed the American position, which was that the 
Yugoslavs should be allowed to choose their own political 
fate and that all elements in the country should work 
together to achieve that goal. He also hinted that it would 
be best if the Yugoslav government could soon be 
reestablished in Belgrade and that Western ambassadors could 
be sent there as representatives to a unified Yugoslav 
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government. He felt that the presence of Allied (Western) 
representatives to a unified Yugoslav government could help 
settle affairs in the country and lessen the increasing 
1 
totalitarian nature of the Yugoslav regime 
The King's hesitation to accept the Tito-~ubasid 
Agreement created problems for him that he could not 
control. His remarks were seen as threatening a very 
promising chance for establishing a united post-war 
government. Tito's faction called the King's protest 
unconstitutional and threatened to use it as a pretext for 
ending the monarchy once and for all. Churchill, in a 
speech to the House of Commons on January 18, 1945, said of 
the King's hesitancy: 
It is a matter of days within which a decision must 
be reached upon these matters, and if we were so 
unfortunate as not to be able to obtain the consent 
of King Peter, the matter, in fact, would have to 
go ahead, his assent being presumed.2 
The United States replied that it had not participated 
in the Tito-Subasic talks and had only approved of their 
broad outline--that they favored the return of the Yugoslav 
Government in Exile, but that even if it returned to 
Yugoslavia, the United States could offer nothing beyond 
provisional representation at Belgrade. 
In a message from the Acting Secretary of State to 
Ambassador Harriman, u. S. envoy to the Soviet Union, the 
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outline of a message received from Stalin via the British 
was sent. Stalin was reported to have favored immediate 
acceptance by all major powers of the Tito-~ubasic Agreement 
and considered U.S. reservations on the subject as an 
encouragement to the King and a possible stumbling block to 
inter-Allied cooperation. He saw the issue as dividing the 
Americans from their British and Soviet partners. 
Ambassador Patterson received a message from the Acting 
Secretary of State outlining the American position on the 
situation on January 29, 1945. He said that America had 
come a long way towards muting the British position, but 
would wait for further clarification from the Yugoslavs 
themselves. 
We understand from the agreement between Marshal 
Tito and Dr. Subasic that the proposed United 
Government of Yugoslavia is to be set up for the 
interim or transitional period pending the holding 
of national elections in which the will of the 
people may be freely expressed. We would be 
prepared to accredit our Ambassador to a government 
set up in Yugoslavia on this basis.3 
In a memorandum written by the Chief of the Division of 
Southern European affairs, Cavendish w. Cannon, the 
situation in Yugoslavia was discussed from the perspective 
of Soviet intentions. Cannon divided his memorandum into 
seven parts. The first five discussed internal Yugoslav 
relationships. He remarked that Serbian support for Tito 
now seemed strong, but that Croatian opinion was divided 
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between Tito and the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party. 
Tito was described as being very much against the Croatian 
Peasant Party. 
The Soviet government has shown no particular 
interest in learning what the United States thinks 
about the Yugoslav situation. It frankly has not 
asked for a common policy. It has its plans and is 
willing to go ahead. The British are trying to 
keep even with the Russians, and one cannot but 
feel their anxiety to have us go along is in large 
part a design to prepare a facade of Allied action 
to cover the interplay of British and Soviet 
political forces in the Balkans and distribute the 
responsibility when the general public later learns 
of the real conditions within Yugoslavia and the 
type of administration the Army expects to set up.4 
Cannon wrote about the impossibility of the Allies 
being on an equal basis in Yugoslavia. He pointed out the 
presence of Soviet troops in the country and Tito's 
acceptance and growing use of Communism in Yugoslavia. He 
wrote that neither Britain nor the Soviet Union had any wish 
to help the Yugoslav people, but were only interested in 
carrying out their political roles in the Balkans. 
Developments in Yugoslavia and with the King in London 
were beginning to affect the situation. It appeared that 
Subasic and members of the Cabinet were preparing to go back 
to Yugoslavia regardless of the King's actions or 
pronouncements. The British had asked the Americans to 
~ ~ I treat the ~ubasic government the same in Belgrade as they 
did in London, if it would finally take residence there. 
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The Secretary of State received a message sent by Kirk on 
February 2, 1954, disclaiming Tito's need to compromise on 
the situation. Tito's position was now considered so strong 
within Yugoslavia that he would not relax his growing 
stranglehold on the country for the benefit of external 
recognition. 
In February, the King finally announced the three men 
he wished to represent him as the Regency Council and to 
deal on his behalf with Tito inside Yugoslavia. However, 
Tito was quick to denounce two of these individuals, and 
affairs appeared to have come to an impasse. Tito thought 
the King was unreasonable and was simply trying to prevent 
the implementation of the Agreement. Tito now threatened to 
try the King for his "crimes1" and the King, for his part, 
stated that he would disavow his entire Cabinet if they went 
to Belgrade. 
Regardless of the actions taken by both the King and 
Tito, the Regents were on their way to Yugoslavia on the 
13th of January. Plans for enlarging AVNOJ and the 
moderation of Yugoslav politics could perhaps begin 
immediately according to reports sent back to the State 
Department. The United States made an official announcement 
concerning events in Yugoslavia (and liberated Europe) on 
February 26, 1945, following discussions at the Crimean 
Conference. 
In the Crimean Declaration of February 11, Roosevelt, 
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Stalin, and Churchill agreed to recommend to Tito and 
~ubasicf that the agreement between them should be put into 
effect immediately and that a new government should be 
formed on the basis of that agreement. At the same time, a 
declaration of liberated Europe was published in which 
Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill agreed to coordinate the 
policies of their governments to assist liberated peoples to 
solve by democratic means their pressing political and 
economic problems. Among the situations in which this 
assistance would be applicable would be cases where, in the 
judgment of the principal Allies, the conditions within a 
liberated state required that interim governmental 
authorities be formed which would be broadly representative 
of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to 
the earliest possible establishment through free elections 
of governments responsible to the will of the people. 
Accordingly, the United States government would 
like to see Subasic and Marshal Tito reach an early 
agreement in accordance with these principles and 
in a spirit of mutual understanding in the 
negotiations now taking place in Belgrade.5 
Still, problems remained with the Yugoslavs themselves. 
The King's nominees to the Regency Council were not 
acceptable to the members of AVNOJ, and the Agreement might 
also have collapsed because of the King's wishes to have the 
complete determination of who was to represent him. 
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~uba~id, who remained in contact with the British, began to 
transmit worried messages about the ability of the Tito-
Subasic~ Agreement to withstand the King's intransigence, 
especially in view of Tito's growing impatience. The 
American government retained its previous policy of not 
forcing the King to act. 
On March 21, James C. Dunn, acting for the Secretary of 
...,, 
State, sent a message to the Yugoslav Charge, Franges, 
acknowledging the formation of the Regency Council on March 
4, 1946 by King Peter. The Regents were Dr. srdjan 
Budisvljevie', Dr. Ante Mandie, and Dusan Sernec. It also 
acknowledged the formation of a new and united government in 
v , 
Yugoslavia with Tito as Acting President and Subasic as 
Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
This note also hinted at sending Ambassador Patterson and 
his staff to Belgrade in the near future. 
American interest in the personal freedoms of the 
Yugoslav population began to be stimulated in 1945. Reports 
and discussions of the feelings of the general populace were 
beginning to be heard. The facade of complete agreement 
between Tito and his National Liberation Front and the 
majority of the Yugoslav population became less secure. A 
report from Europe by American representatives began to tell 
different stories: 
In general, the present regime is referred to by 
the people as 'those people' and it seems evident 
that when the government is established a great 
deal will be expected of it. That it will be the 
same thing as at present under different color is 
realized only by a relative few.7 
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Messages now began to flood Washington outlining the 
internal situation in Yugoslavia. The Partisans were 
granted influence and some degree of popularity for their 
prosecution of the war, but nowhere could it be determined 
that they were universally popular. It became increasingly 
evident that they were more feared than trusted. In fact, 
terrorism was a term gaining currency for many observers of
Yugoslav internal affairs. 
The new government was not believed to have much power, 
and the growing strength of the Tito element was evident in 
all areas of the country's life. Kirk described the power 
as being held by Tito, Kardelj, Hubrang, and Djilas, among 
others, all of whom, he was quick to point out, were Moscow-
8 
trained and oriented. 
In April, Tito requested American aid from Ambassador 
Patterson. In that meeting, the Americans were also 
i~formed that Tito would visit the Soviet Union to discuss 
matters with the top members of the Soviet Government. 
Averill Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
could only speculate in a message to Washington what had 
occurred between Tito and his Soviet hosts. He speculated, 
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however, on a possible alliance between the two countries 
and that any concrete policy decisions would have to wait 
the test of time to see whether the Yugoslavs and the 
9 
Soviets would work in greater coordination. 
Ambassador Patterson relayed the views of Milan Grol, a 
member of the new government and an important pre-war 
Serbian politician. He described the situation in 
Yugoslavia as growing dimmer daily as Communists 
increasingly took hold of virtually all the political and 
administrative posts. ~ ~ I Subasic was described as a virtual 
prisoner, while acting as Yugoslav Foreign Minister, and 
there was almost no one in the government who could. argue 
for greater democratization of the Yugoslav society. It was 
also suggested that Tito was a Soviet puppet. 
Carl F. Norton of the Division of Southern European 
Affai~s, sent a memorandum to Washington discussing the 
internal affairs in Yugosalvia as he perceived that the 
Partisans viewed them. Edward Kardelj , perhaps the number 
two or three man in the Partisan movement, was interviewed. 
He, as could be expected, supported the actions of AVNOJ and 
Tito. He explained that most members of the pre-war 
political elite had disgraced themselves by their actions 
during the war and could not be allowed to participate in 
the new government. Kardelj also contrasted the Yugoslav 
experience with the United States. He remarked that long 
periods of dictatorship and falsified elections had ill-
111 
prepared the Yugoslavs for a democracy in the American mold. 
He stated that Yugoslavia must make its own road, and, 
unlike America, it had many traitors and war criminals to 
deal with. It can be assumed that these views were at least 
semi-official and contrasted greatly with those of Grol, 
who, unlike Kardelj, was in no position to do anything about 
10 
it. 
The Soviet Union and the Regency Council of Yugoslavia 
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar 
Cooperation in Moscow on April 11, 1945. When Harriman 
reported the event to Washington on April 13, 1945, 
he mentioned that the treaty was almost identical to the one 
signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. 
However, there was one exception that Harriman noted: 
Article 3, which declares that the contracting 
parties would participate in a spirit of the most 
sincere cooperation in all international activities 
directed to secure peace and security •••• "11 
American-Yugoslav difficulties began to increase as 
Yugoslav soldiers pushed outside their borders into Austria 
and Italy. American and British troops were in a virtual 
race to liberate Trieste before the Partisans could capture 
the city. Both the Yugoslavs and the Western Allies wished 
to control Trieste for its geographical and economic 
importance. To Yugoslavia, it represented a far larger and 
more modern port than anything then or in the foreseeable 
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future available in Yugoslavia. It also would be a feather 
in the cap of Socialist Yugoslavia, aiding Socialists in 
other countries, in particular, Italy. The British and 
Americans saw it as the southern gateway into Austria, the 
logical port for Austrian commerce. It was also of 
political significance because they wished to prevent 
Yugoslav/Russian presence in the territory. The Western 
Allies feared that Yugoslavs in Trieste would strengthen and 
aid the growing Italian Socialist movement, and neither 
power wished to see Italy become a Socialist state. 
During the problems in Trieste, Churchill and Harry s. 
Truman, Roosevelt's successor, kept a running correspondence 
concerning Yugoslav actions. Both leaders considered Tito 
to be backed by the Soviet Union. Truman cited a message he 
~eceived from Stalin on May 23. Truman wrote: "The Russian 
Premier backed Tito in his claims and hoped that the 
conflict would be terminated by "our acceptance of the 
12 
Yugoslav position." Churchill wrote that 
In order to avoid leading Tito or the Yugoslav 
commanders into any temptation, it would be wise to 
have a solid mass of troops in this area, with a 
great superiority of modern weapons •••• 13 
Truman cabled Churchill stating that he was 
"increasingly concerned over the implications of Tito's 
14 
actions in Venezia Giulia •• " He wrote that Tito's . . 
forces must immediately submit themselves to the authority 
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of the Allied Commander. Churchill termed Truman's message 
15 
"a most welcome and strong message." The two Western 
Allies now pushed in large numbers of troops under British 
command and caused the eventual evacuation of Yugoslav 
forces from Trieste. The Soviets protested but did little 
else, and Truman was relieved that no fighting had occurred 
so that he could concentrate on ending the war in the 
Pacific. Churchill was happy to be able to confront Stalin 
with a combined effort against Tito and hoped it might carry 
into other diplomatic problems. He wrote: "I need not say 
how relieved I was to receive this invaluable support from 
16 
my new companion." Truman summarized his feelings on 
Venezia Giulia thusly: "The American government never for a 
moment considered that Trieste should go to Yugoslavia. 
17 
That was Roosevelt's position, and it was mine." 
The American and British opposition to the occupation 
of Trieste provoked General Jovanovid, Chief of Staff of the 
Yugoslav Army, who "rudely requested British and American 
military missions in Belgrade (and their field 
18 
representatives) to leave Yugoslavia." 
The United States had, however, indicated that certain 
border corrections might be made along the old Yugoslav-
Italian border, but that any such move must wait for the 
appropriate peace treaty. In May, Secretary of State 
Stettinius and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Subasi~ held a 
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meeting in San Francisco in which Subasid requested lend-
lease aid. Subasid was rebuked for the Yugoslav attitude 
concerning Venezia Giulia and Carinthia. Stettinius saw no 
chance of aiding Yugoslavia until its attitude softened. 
on his way back to Belgrade, Subasic stopped in 
Washington and continued his high-level talks with members 
of the State Department. There he once again put forth 
Yugoslav claims to be a part of the administration of 
Venezia Giulia. He was told that Marshal Alexander was the 
primary authority in the area and that any Yugoslav actions 
would have to be subordinated to his wishes. When 
V V I discussion turned to the Yalta formulas, Subasic had been 
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defensive in his response, "progress has been slow." 
v v I Upon arriving in Belgrade, Subasic held talks with the 
American Ambassador, who once again cautioned him to stop 
Yugoslav actions in the Venezia Giulia area. The Ambassador 
warned of Yugoslav problems with American public opinion, 
which now considered Yugoslavia a virtual Communist 
dictatorship on the Russian model. As the American 
government began to receive further information on Yugoslav 
developments, their scepticism of Tito's aims grew. The 
fulfillment of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia became 
increasingly in doubt.* The State Department began 
* This is in reference to a freely-chosen government and freedom of speech and pre~s. 
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receiving messages from its representatives throughout 
Europe regarding the events within Yugoslavia. These 
reports, which became redundant, told of the political 
killings of opponents of the Partisans, persecution of the 
clergy, and the nationalization of private industry, 
including the property of American nationals and 
corporations. 
The American press printed many articles containing 
criticism of Yugoslavia. The press described Yugoslavia as 
a dictatorship growing daily in its ability to stifle 
thought and opposition within the country. Sam Pope Brewer 
of The New York Times wrote that civil rights, as understood 
in America, did not exist in Yugoslavia and that all forms 
of censorship were being increasingly foisted upon 
Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia today is a striking picture of conflict 
between the high democratic ideals repeatedly 
proclaimed by her leaders and oppressive strong 
armed methods in running the Government. It is a 
tyranny exercised in the name of the people by a 
minority too well organized and too heavily armed 
to be disputed.20 
The American Ambassador to France, Lafferty, described 
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Yugoslavia as a "Communist dictatorship." The State 
Department again had more harsh words to describe the 
attitude of the Yugoslav government to the Yalta 
Declaration. It called Yugoslavia's attempt at implementing 
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the accords "a farce and a mockery." In the same piece, 
the State Department quoted a speech given by Tito in Serbia 
on June 17, 1945. In his speech, Tito mentioned the great 
help Yugoslavia had received from the Soviet Union. The 
State Department pointed out that "no mention has been made 
throughout the speech of any help coming during or after the 
23 
war from any of the Western Allies." 
The American Charge in Yugoslavia, Harold Shantz, 
stated: 
I am convinced that there is no hope of free 
democracy here and that the new laws will be window 
dressing for totalitarian communist regime.24 
The situation in Yugoslavia was not lost to the King, 
who also understood its implications for him. He stated 
publicly and later wrote in his autobiography that Tito had 
repudiated the Tito-Subasit Agreement and was not living up 
to the Yalta recommendations and that he must also repudiate 
h • v b ""•I t e Tito-Su asic Agreement. King Peter announced once again 
that he was sole arbiter of the royal perogative within 
Yugoslavia and the Regents were discharged from their 
25 
responsibilities. His pronouncements met with only 
limited response as his position was almost hopeless without 
massive support from both Great Britain and the United 
States. 
In an unofficial meeting with Tito, the American 
Ambassador Patterson reported to President Truman 
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••• I told Tito that without the authority of my 
government and unofficially, he could expect no 
economic help from my country whatsoever unless he 
carried out his solemn commitments made at Yalta 
and upon which we recognized him. The President 
replied, 'You did the right thing.'26 
The United States and Great Britain were becoming very 
upset by events in Eastern Europe at this time. The Western 
Allies felt that the Yalta Declarations on freedom of choice 
and the establishments of democratic governments were being 
ignored by the Soviet Union. The Soviet ability to 
transform governments into a socialist form was troublesome 
and occurred without consulting Western viewpoints. 
Yugoslavia was considered a prime example, but events along 
these lines were happening in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria 
at this time. The Western Allies began to view Eastern 
Europe as a Soviet colony with Yugoslavia perhaps working 
under orders direct from Moscow, and they resented Soviet 
domination. 
Milovan Djilas, a leading Partisan intellectual and 
political leader, in a speech reported by Shantz to 
Washington, discussed the Partisan viewpoint on the upcoming 
elections. His remarks were seen as a blatant example of 
the Tito regime's confidence in its position within 
Yugoslavia. The remarks did nothing to calm American 
apprehensions, but only added fuel to the American belief 
that Yugoslavia would go her own way regardless of Yalta. 
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The Secretary of State held a discussion with King 
Peter in London on September 13, 1945. The two men 
discussed the internal situation in Yugoslavia and the 
upcoming elections. 
King Peter said that the four freedoms guaranteed 
by the Allies did not exist in Yugoslavia and that 
Marshal Tito had violated all his promises to the 
Allies in that he had ignored his commitments 
outlined in the Tito-Subasic Agreement, to which 
the Secretary replied, in essence, that he had been 
informed of this •••• Peter said, 'If you permit 
the elections to be held now, and they are not 
free, then you will be forced not to recognize the 
government which results from such elections!' To 
this, Secretary Byrnes indicated that was a 
possibility. 
The King made one last point at this meeting: 
King Peter then said 'we have had many nice words 
and promises from the Allies, but no action.' The 
Secretary replied • • • that on that point many 
people agreed.27 
The State Department received a message from a 
representatiave in Yugoslavia on September 15, 1945. It 
reported that the opposition candidates had removed 
themselves from the election lists because they considered 
the forthcoming elections to be neither democratic nor 
representative of the political will of the people. 
On September 27, 1945, Harold Shantz, State Department 
Representative in Yugoslavia, wrote a long report to the 
State Department concerning his views on the internal 
28 
affairs in Yugoslavia. His report was very representative 
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of the mainstream of American thoughts on Yugoslavia at this 
time. He reported that the elections to be held on November 
11, 1945, could not express the free will of the people and 
should be postponed. He later wrote in this report that 
democracy in Yugoslavia had disappeared and the country was 
being governed by external forces. He wrote, "Yet a 
relatively small group of Communists inspired and directed 
by Moscow, has succeeded in fostering a ruthless 
totalitarian police regime on the Yugoslavs." He added 
later that "The regime and its chief public agency, the 
National Front, are in effect tools of the Central Committee 
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of the Communist Party. Tito is an agent of Moscow." 
Schantz ended his report by writing that Yugoslavia was a 
country living in fear and that the United States could do 
nothing but use moral force to help the people. 
Patterson reported to the Secretary of State on October 
10, 1945, of the resignations from the Yugoslav Government 
of Grol, Sutej, V v v I Subasic, and Junakovic (the Vice President 
of the Yugoslav National Bank). \/ ' Suba~ic said that his 
agreements with Tito had not been carried out and that he 
owed it to the people to resign. 
Tito spoke with a touring group of American 
congressmen, and he expressed surprise at the resignations. 
He stated that there were no differences and that the 
opposition leaders were wrong in their views of the Yugoslav 
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political scene. Tito was quoted by Patterson on this 
occasion, after announcing that 200,000 Yugoslavs had been 
demobilized: "He said demobilization for Yugoslavia is a 
social as well as a military problem since many soldiers 
have no home or livelihood to return to." Later in the same 
report, Patterson noted 
Congressmen upon leaving the airport today said 
Tito's presentation was to them unconvincing and it 
had hedged on important questions of large army and 
plight of opposition.30 
V 'V I Patterson also talked to Subasic about recent 
developments. V v I · Subasic confirmed that Tito had accepted his 
resignation, but stated that he would not announce it 
publicly for fear of its effect on Big Power relations • 
., y , 
Subasic stated that he believed that Tito was not the 
supreme power in the country, but shared it with Kardelj and 
Rankovic. V '°' I Subasic said that he had already been accused of 
being an agent for Great Britain and the United States. He 
also reported that leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party 
were now more than ever behind Vlado Ma~ek (the Party 
leader). 
Patterson received a message from the Secretary of 
State in reference to an August 29, 1945 loan request from 
the Yugoslavs. 
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In view of the political situation in Yugoslavia, 
s. E. feels that the United States should be cool 
toward a loan to Yugoslavia at the present time. 
The Export Import Bank is not contemplating any 
action on the request until questions of policy are 
settled by the Department. It is generally agreed 
that the figure of $300 million is entirely too 
large.31 
More internal problems arose after Grol held a meeting 
with touring American congressmen, who reported that the 
reason he removed himself from the election was that he 
feared to appear in public for his own safety and could not 
ask his followers to expose themselves to similar dangers. 
Religious leaders in Yugoslavia were also very much 
against the regime. Archbishop Stepinac and other Catholic 
leaders published many charges against the regime's brutal 
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and undemocratic conduct. 
James Reston wrote in The New York Times on October 12, 
1945 about the political situation in Yugoslavia. He stated 
the usual attacks against the growth of totalitarianism in 
the country and also the lack of follow-through on the part 
of Tito and his followers regarding the Yalta Declarations. 
More importantly, he wrote publicly about the dilemma now 
facing the American government--how to handle the problem of 
recognizing the Tito regime when the regents and almost all 
members of the old pre-war political parties had resigned 
and refused to participate in the forthcoming elections. 
As expected, the State Department also began exploring 
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its relationship with Yugoslavia. The Crimea Conference 
influenced the American attitudes on Yugoslavia to the Tito-
~ubaSic Agreement, but with Suba~ic's resignation, the State 
Department believed that the Agreement lost its validity. 
How could the Yugoslav government now be considered a 
"proper instrument" if only one side was now represented in 
the government? The American government sought the help of 
the Soviet Union and Great Britain in bringing about a 
reconciliation between Tito and Subasic. In lieu of this, 
the State Department sent messages to Moscow and London 
asking those governments to urge Tito to postpone the coming 
elections. 
Patterson held discussions with Tito in Belgrade on 
American-Yugoslav relations in which he stated the American 
position about the abrogation of the Yalta Declaration by 
Yugoslavia and the concern for the internal repression in 
Yugoslavia. He brought up in particular the lack of a free 
press and the lack of meaning a one-party election would 
have. Tito replied that Yugoslavia had met her obligations 
as discussed at Yalta and that laws had been passed 
guaranteeing freedom of the press and free elections. 
The American government was quick to receive the 
British and Soviet responses to its request to have Tito 
postpone the elections. The Russians stated that there were 
no grounds to interfere in Yugoslavia and that the present 
Yugoslav government (Tito's) should be allowed to set its 
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own date for the election. The British, although more 
sympathetic than the Russians, also believed it better to 
stay out of internal Yugoslav affairs and let the elections 
go as scheduled. It seemed that the British had recognized 
Tito's future success and did not wish to antagonize him, 
which might result in repercussions later. 
Ambassador Patterson sent a recapitulation of the 
American position vis-vis Yugoslavia to the Yugoslav 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tito) on November 6, 1945. 
Patterson told Tito that the United States viewed the 
upcoming election as unrepresentative of the Yugoslav 
people. He also stressed that it was so set up that the 
opposition leaders had felt it necessary to remain away from 
this contest. He said that these circumstances had brought 
the very validity of the elections into question and without 
the guarantees outlined in the Tito-~ubasi~ Agreement being 
met, the prestige of the Yugoslav government and confidence 
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in it abroad would suffer. 
The Yugoslavs held the election on schedule. Patterson 
sent a report back to Washington in which he described the 
elections as fairly quiet. He said by this time no 
"terroristic" methods were needed and the population was 
well behaved. The results were reported as 83.2% for the 
Front and 16.8% for the Opposition. 
Because of the regime subsequently installed in 
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Yugoslavia, much debate went on within the American 
government as to what status it should give former members 
of the old Yugoslav regime whom the Tito government demanded 
be returned to face trial. Patterson wrote that categories 
defined by the Yugoslav government were so nebulous as to 
allow for any interpretation deemed appropriate by Yugoslav 
authorities. Therefore, America must be careful to avoid 
sending innocent people back to the country. Patterson 
believed that individuals returned to the country had 
already been judged and were most probably already 
condemned. 
Tito responded to Ambassador Patterson's fears on 
November 19, 1945. Tito said that the recommendations of 
the Yalta Conference had been fully carried out and that any 
objections to this fact could have no real substance. He 
wrote that Yugoslavia could now consider all her obligations 
to the Allied governments as carried out. The people had 
responded on November 11, 1945, by their vast support for 
the government in the election. Tito also discussed the 
King, whom he said had no place in the country, because the 
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people no longer recognized or wanted him. 
The British and the Russians had made no protests over 
the elections and instantly recognized the results. The 
United States, on the other hand, was not sure it would 
recognize the election. 
A memorandum prepared by the Acting Chief, Division of 
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Southern European Affairs, Samuel Reber, was sent to the 
Secretary of State on November 24, 1945. This memorandum 
discussed recent events in Yugoslavia, including the 
election and Tito's message in which he declared the 
fulfillment of Yugoslavia's obligations as set forth in the 
Yalta Declaration. He wrote at length about reaccrediting 
Ambassador Patterson to the new Yugoslav government. He 
pointed out that he was still accredited to the now non-
existent Royal government. He wrote that there were 
obviously grounds for the American government to withhold 
such recognition, but saw no valid reason to do so. He 
recommended that the United States bite the bullet and 
recognize the Tito regime. However, he was adamant in 
refusing any economic assistance to Yugoslavia. He felt 
that aid could perhaps give the United States some leverage 
in lessening the "terrorism" within Yugoslavia. 
Ambassador Patterson began, by late 1945, to send more 
frequent examples of Yugoslavia's increasingly anti-Western 
stance. He cited the fact that radio stations and 
publishing houses had been restricted from using American or 
British news sources. On November 29, 1945, Patterson wrote 
the Secretary of State and asked that the U.S. withhold 
recognition of the Tito regime. He also stated that 
Belgrade was, in foreign policy terms, a "Soviet Republic," 
that the regime was hostile to America and Britain and could 
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not stand on its own without Soviet support. 
Ambassador Patterson believed, like the British, that 
the Yugoslav majority was anti-Communist, that in a free 
election Communist representation would all but disappear. 
He, like Peter, believed that if left to its own political 
devices, the Tito regime would slowly liberalize the country 
and bring it into closer alignment with the United States 
and Britain. He stated that at present, however, "the U.S. 
has no influence on this regime and cannot have as long as 
36 
normal recognition is extended." 
The Ambassador summed up the financial situation of the 
Yugoslavs thusly: 
Economically, people are rapidly being stripped of 
their possessions. Before long, private capital 
and business will have diappeared, even if some 
business continues to be done in some private 
firms. Government gives lip service to private 
trade hoping to gain our economic support while 
concealing its ultimate objectives.37 
December 1, 1945, the abolition of the monarchy was 
announced, and the Federative National Republic of 
Yugoslavia was established. Acting Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, notified the Secretary of State in Moscow of the 
latest messages received from Ambassador Patterson in 
Yugoslavia. With the impending British recognition of the 
new Yugoslav government, (Britain recognized the new 
government on December 15, 1945), a possible presidential 
response was sent to Byrnes. It stated first that the 
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United States was still very concerned about the personal 
freedoms of the Yugoslav peoples; secondly, that the 
situation had not changed since the election; and, thirdly, 
that if the u. s. government recognized the new Yugoslav 
government, this would by no means be considered as an 
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acceptance of internal Yugoslav policies. 
The American attitude toward Yugoslavia changed little 
in 1945. The United States government knew who held the 
power and ran Yugoslavia, but was as yet not ready to change 
its diplomatic stance. 
Early in 1946, the problem of granting Tito permission 
to come to the United States was again brought to the fore. 
Tito wanted to come for an official visit to the United 
States to increase his and his regime's prestige and if 
possible to secure American economic aid for Yugoslavia. 
Patterson received a message from the Acting Secretary of 
State concerning Tito's request for a visit to the United 
States, which stated that the u. s. could see no good coming 
from a visit by Tito. Such a visit could create trouble 
within the American-Yugoslav community as it might be 
construed as an acceptance or an approval of Tito's methods 
and actions within Yugoslavia. The Acting Secretary also 
reiterated the fact that under present political 
circumstances, the United States was not ready to discuss 
aid for Yugoslavia. Patterson was instructed to relay these 
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views semi-officially to the Yugoslavs. 
Yugoslavia became more interested in receiving U. S. 
economic aid to help in its postwar economic development. 
However, American responses to these inquiries were 
consistently negative. The United States was worried about 
Yugoslav claims to parts of Austria and Italy and was even 
more concerned about a possible abrogation of previous 
Yugoslav government economic and financial agreements. 
At the same time as these discussions were being 
carried out within the State Department, the Secretary of 
State publicly defined the current status of American 
recognition of Yugoslavia. Byrnes pointed out that the 
United States had never completed its recognition of Tito. 
He also reminded his listeners that Ambassador Patterson was 
still accredited to the King and was an interim 
representative in Belgrade. He said that the United States 
was waiting to see whether Yugoslavia would observe its 
obligatons under the "existing treaties of amity and 
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commerce." 
It had become apparent that the status quo between the 
United States and Yugoslavia could not be maintained 
indefinitely. The Secretary of State held another news 
conference in Washington on March 12, 1946, in which he 
again pointed out the difficulty in fully recognizing the 
regime in Yugoslavia. He again stated that the United 
States was waiting for Yugoslavia to accept its 
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international obligations. He also added that the United 
States wished to see personal freedoms and q free election 
held in Yugoslavia. 
Secretary of State Byrnes sent President Truman a 
memorandum on April 9, 1946, in which he recommended the 
recognition by the United States of the current government 
in Yugoslavia, as well as the accreditation of Kosanovic! as 
the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States. He stated 
that Yugoslavia had finally agreed to accept its 
international obligations and responsibilities. He ended 
his memorandum by suggesting that the United States fully 
accredit Ambassador Patterson to the present Yugoslav 
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regime. 
On April 16, 1946, the United States government 
delivered a message to the Yugoslav Charge d'Affairs 
offering a formal recognition of the Yugoslav government. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The United States' first involvement in Yugoslavia was 
to try to prevent the country from joining the Tripartite 
Pact and then to encourage Yugoslav resistance to the 
expected German invasion. These American moves mirrored 
closely the British actions of the time. The United States 
would follow or react to British initiatives throughout 
world War II regarding Yugoslavia. The United States, after 
its initial enthusiasm for Yugoslavia following the coup in 
1941, retreated from any major actions concerning that 
country for months and left the British to do as they wished 
in Yugoslavia. 
Churchill, more than any American leader, was 
responsible for dividing Western actions in Yugoslavia. 
Although America became directly involved in Yugoslavia, it 
was usually as a response to some event that had already 
been carried out, for example the Tito-~ubasid Agreement or 
the outlawing of the monarchy by the Tito regime. The 
United States recognized that the British and the Soviets 
had special interests in the area and wished to remain free 
of these powers and deal with Yugoslavia on strictly 
American terms. 
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Because the United States had no special interests in 
Yugoslavia, it thought to prevent any major assistance, 
either military or political to Yugoslavia. This was to 
allow America to use its resources in more important areas 
of the war. America was far more engaged in the Pacific 
war than were either the British or the Soviets, and the 
Americans never let themselves become too involved in 
Yugoslavia or the Balkans because of it. 
The American policy during the war was to maintain 
proper diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government, 
but not to commit itself to any substantial degree. When 
the United States once again returned to Yugoslav soil, it 
was only on a very limited basis. The American military 
mission and later political representatives allowed the 
United States to form its own opinions on the war in 
Yugoslavia. This brought American knowledge of internal 
Yugoslav affairs to a level higher than it had been for 
years, but still allowed the United States to limit its 
response to Yugoslav issues. 
The United States became aware of the Yugoslav civil 
war and wished it to cease, but no American initiatives were 
brought forward to help end it. The United States insisted 
that its aid in Yugoslavia be used in eliminating the 
external foe and not be used against domestic opponents. 
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The United States would recognize Tito's position and 
even credited him with a degree of popularity in the 
country, but was unhappy with his political tone and ever-
increasing totalitarianism, i.e., Soviet measures within the 
country. Tito held power; the Americans knew it and finally 
accepted it. They realized that any serious attempt to try 
to influence the Yugoslav domestic situation could be both 
expensive and time-consuming, using resources earmarked for 
other, more important areas. 
The American governmen.t lost almost no troops on 
Yugoslav soil, and its economic commitment during the war 
was insignificant, as it was to remain until 1948. 
Yugoslavia was never treated as a major theater for American 
actions, nor was it every seriously considered for such a 
role regardless of British and/or Yugoslav government 
(Royal) hopes. The American policy of non-intervention was 
successfully followed and, even after the recognition of the 
new Yugoslav situation, the United States remained only 
passively interested in that country. American aid for Tito 
came years after the war and then only after he had reacted 
against Soviet pressure. The King, although not speaking 
just about the Americans, remarked bitterly about his 
government's treatment by the Western Allies. 
I most certainly feel that no act of mine was or 
could have been responsible for the vile treatment 
I and my government received so unexpectedly and 
unjustly.! 
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President Truman characterized his policy in Yugoslavia 
as keeping America out of any Balkan imbroglio and concluded 
that events in Yugoslavia were carried forward by their own 
momentum: 
I was trying to be extremely careful not to get us 
mixed up in a Balkan turmoil. The Balkans had long 
been a source of trouble and war. I believed that 
if the political situation in the Balkans could be 
adjusted so that Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and 
Bulgaria, as well as Poland and Austria could all 
have governments of their own people's choosing 
with no outside influence, this would help us in 
our own plans for peace. 
I did not want to become involved in the Balkans in 
a way that would lead us into another world 
conflict. In any case, I was anxious to get the 
Russians into the war against Japan as soon as 
possible, thus saving countless Americans. 
CHAPTER VIII 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
The secondary works used in this study were written 
from many different perspectives and for many different 
reasons. The majority of works to be discussed here cover 
Yugoslavia only as a small part of a large and complex 
problem. Authors such as Herbert Feis and Gabriel Kolko are 
among this group. There were also books which dealt directly 
with Yugoslavia and which were much more restrictive in 
their subject matter. This bibliographical essay is 
concerned with both types of works and will begin with 
material which is specific to Yugoslavia. 
Walter Roberts' Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies was 
written by an American diplomat who had worked and spent 
much time in Yugoslavia. He reviewed his work as a broad 
general outline of wartime events in Yugoslavia. In the 
introduction, he states that he wished to clarify and 
correct many misconceptions about Yugoslavia. He tried to 
cover the topic from a neutral perspective, attempting to 
refrain from being overly enthusiastic about either of the 
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two main characters in Yugoslavia during the war--Draza 
Mihailovicand the Cetniks and Josip Broz Tito and the 
Partisans. It must be admitted that he succeeded in 
comparison to works such as Constantin Foti6 1 s (Ambassador 
to the United States from Yugoslavia during the war) The War 
We Lost, or Vladimir Dedijer's (who participated at the 
pinnacle of Partisan leadership and planning) Tito. Men 
such as these have been too closely involved and tried only 
to embellish their side's collective accomplishments, while 
conversely assailing their opponents at will and with little 
regard for accuracy. However, the reader must be cautioned 
about being too optimistic regarding Roberts, as his sources 
are weighted heavily on the Partisan (Communist) side. 
Although this is understandable, the former Partisans now 
control the literature and sources on this topic in 
Yugoslavia, so the material is biased. Even today, 
Yugoslavia still worries about the legitimization of its 
Communist takeover. 
Roberts also used many primary sources from British 
authors. Since his book covers a much broader topic than 
this paper, most British material cannot be accurately 
discussed. This author agrees with Roberts that it was 
written, as almost all books are, to substantiate the 
feelings and experiences of the author. (e.g., Fitzroy 
Maclean's Disputed Barricade). 
To be more specific, Roberts wrote about the war in 
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Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945, while this paper is more 
closely limited to American-Yugoslav relations from 1941 to 
1946. He wrote about all phases of the conflict, spending a 
great deal of time on the fighting itself--a topic that is 
discussed only in passing in this paper, as it, in most 
cases, did not greatly affect American diplomatic responses 
nor did it hasten or impede America's final diplomatic 
recognition of the Tito regime. Nevertheless, this author 
did use a great many of the same sources, including the 
Foreign Relations of the United States and several 
autobiographies. 
Roberts must also be compared to the authors discussed 
later, including Feis, whom Roberts mentions in his 
bibliography and who closely resembles his approach to the 
problems, except that Roberts, like this author, spent 
proportionately far less time on Venezia Giulia than does 
Feis. Feis discussed the Venezia Giulia situation in great 
depth because of its broader outlines. This was a small 
part of the story for both this author and for Roberts. 
Venezia Guila had important implications in the beginnings 
of the Cold War, but for this paper, it is less important 
than it was for either Feis or Kolko. The situation in 
Venezia Giulia was not finally settled until approximately a 
decade after America recognized Yugoslavia. It was also, in 
this author's opinion, overblown in importance as Yugoslavia 
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would, in 1948, break with the Soviet Union; and the area 
would help isolate Yugoslavia from both the East and the 
West. 
Roberts, and Kolko in The Politics of War, were in 
agreement in only a few places; overall they differed far 
more than they agreed. They concurred in describing Tito's 
disagreements and misunderstandings with the Soviets during 
the war. Kolko, however, was much more adamant in seeing 
anti-Soviet beliefs and feelings than was Roberts. Roberts, 
whose perspective on the matter is similar to that of this 
author, saw the Partisans as working for an independent and 
Socialist Yugoslavia after the war. They could not-
understand Soviet broader perspectives and were by no means 
anti-Soviet. In this latter belief, Roberts and this author 
come very close to Vojtech Mastny's description of the 
Yugoslav-Russian situation in Russia's Road to the Cold War 
Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945. 
Unlike Kolko, however, Roberts' treatment of the 
American involvement in Yugoslavia during the war parallels 
Feis and this author in asserting that American influence 
was by design limited and not intended, as Kolko asserted, 
to be a deciding factor in Yugoslav-Balkan affairs. 
To this writer, Roberts' book was very helpful in 
providing a general outline and a start for researching and 
understanding the broad outlines of this topic. Below, some 
of the material covered by Roberts is discussed in more 
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detail, and comments have been added where pertinent. 
Roberts, as stated, traced American involvement in 
Yugoslavia during the war. This, of course, was at first 
limited to military liaison officers and only at the very 
end of the war by any foreign service officers. He 
discussed how the Americans joined the British missions 
already in the field. "From the very beginning, it was 
clear, however, that the British were the senior partners in 
1 
this enterprise." 
Summing up American actions in the Balkans at the end 
of 1942, he said: 
For the United States, Yugoslavia was at that time 
a distant country, the geography of which had only 
a limited significance in the pursuit of the war. 
America regretted the existence of a civil war and 
since it recognized the Yugoslav Government-in-
Exile as the only legal government, it felt duty-
bound to support it and its Commander in 
Yugoslavia, General Mihailovic. 
Roberts spent much time showing how the forces of Tito 
and Mihailovi~ reacted to each other and the total war 
situation in Yugoslavia. He summed up the American actions 
in Yugoslavia at the end of 1943 as pragmatic in their 
willingness to help all parties fighting the Germans. 
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The United States had only military and strategic 
considerations in mind in the Balkans. It is 
believed that if Tito was fighting and Mihailovic 
was not, then Tito should be supported1 but this 
support should be modest and in no way detract from 
the pursuit of a grand strategy in which Balkan 
affairs did not figure. Hence, U. S. interest in 
the Balkans was limited. In the U. S. view, to aid 
Tito did not mean that the political support of the 
Yugoslav Government-In-Exile should not continue.3 
Roberts also summed up the military situation in 
Yugoslavia at this time. The Italians had surrendered, and 
the ability of the Allies to defeat Germany was no longer 
questioned by the author. Tito's Partisans had been 
recognized by the Big Three, and the Partisans were well on 
the way to winning the Yugoslav civil war. Still, Roberts 
commented that this did not lead to any American political 
posturing caused by the changing events within Yugoslavia. 
The United States did begin to play a more active role 
in Yugoslavia in 1944. American policy was no longer in 
agreement with Britain, nor did American military missions 
continue to subordinate themselves to the British. In 
August of 1944, the Americans set up an independent mission 
at the Partisan headquarters on Vis, after the British and 
Soviets had already done so. Roberts described Robert D. 
Murphy's mission to Tito as in no way giving the impression 
of any political recognition. 
Roberts wrote at length of the Tito-Suba~i~ meetings 
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and agreements. He summed up the American role in these 
activities as "Once again, the United States refused to 
become involved in Yugoslav political matters, thus leaving 
4 
the field entirely to the British and.the Russians.2 
Roberts summed up the American attitude at the end of 
1944: 
American leaders were not greatly surprised to 
learn of Tito's aims and aspirations. The u. s. 
supported the Royal Government-In-Exile and saw no 
reason to deviate from this support even though it 
was at the same time giving military assistance to 
Tito because he was resisting the Germans. Since 
the American military interest in the Balkans was 
peripheral, it took the u. S. government a long· 
time--until late 1944--to become involved in the 
political situation in Yugoslavia, and then only 
because of British pressure.5 
Roberts wrote that America finally became aware of 
Tito's aspirations by the end of 1944, but did little to 
elaborate on this topic. He did write that Yugoslavia was 
hardly mentioned at Yalta and other conferences, which has 
been denied by very few writers, including this author. 
Unlike Roberts, and, for that matter, the remainder of the 
authors to be discussed, this paper continues after most of 
them have finished; and its topic is narrower. This author 
spent a great deal of time discussing Yugoslav internal 
politics and how they fit into America's position in the 
post-war world. 
Harry M. Chase, Jr.'s book, American-Yugoslav 
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Relations, 1945-19661 A Study in the Motivation of U.S. 
Foreign Policy, was written from his doctoral dissertation. 
It is a case study of how American foreign policy is 
formulated and put into motion. Unfortunately, the majority 
of this book covered an era outside the scope of this paper. 
In the corresponding section of Chase's book, his and this 
author's bibliographies closely parallel one another, with 
one notable exception. Chase used the Congressional Record, 
a source which neither this author nor any of the others 
mentioned in this paper used to any extent. He also used 
the Department of State's Bulletin more than this author 
did1 this author found the Bulletin to be of limited use and 
not specific enough for his topic. Chase wrote his 
dissertation before the Foreign Relations of the United 
States volumes had been published covering the time frame of 
his and this paper. Regardless of this, he would have found 
little to have helped his writing. 
The Foreign Relations of the United States spent very 
little time discussing Congress and only devoted a few pages 
to discussing individual congressmen. This author's 
findings on the topic of Yugoslav-American relations showed 
that Congress had, overall, very little importance and was 
not considered by the State Department when formulating 
policy in Yugoslavia. -There are, of course, valid reasons 
for this, the most important being that Yugoslavia was of 
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little importance to the United States, both before and 
during the war--a fact that Chase stressed on more than one 
occasion. Also, Congress had virtually no access to the 
political events within Yugoslavia during this period and, 
with the lack of large numbers of Yugoslav immigrants in the 
United States, had little reason to concern itself anyway. 
In defense of Chase, Congress did play a more active role in 
Yugoslav matters after the Yugoslav-Russian break in 1948, 
but again, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
n 
Chase sums up pre-war American-Yugoslav relations as 
• characterized by the lack of any real significance 
6 
for either nation." During the war years, he stated that 
Churchill led the policy decisions on Yugoslavia and that 
American relations " ••• did not possess any intrinsic 
closeness throughout the war; that is, they were not 
important in and of themselves, but were merely a minor 
issue in the total picture of the war effort and its major 
7 
feature: the necessity of defeating Germany." 
Chase differed little from the others mentioned in this 
respect and can again be found in general agreement as he 
characterized American concerns with Yugoslavia at Potsdam 
and Yalta as minimal at best. He was interested in 
Congressional response to Yugoslav matters which separated 
him from the other authors, as none of them addressed this 
topic in their works. He wrote concerning this issue: 
Legislative attitudes toward Yugoslavia present 
some lack of any definitive policy, or basis for 
policy, which we have also seen as characteristic 
of the Executive Branch of government, especially 
during the months of 1945. Indeed, the few 
references to Yugoslavia present a picture of 
changing sentiment toward Yugoslavia, but no hint 
of any formulated ideas about policy to be 
pursued.8 
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Gabriel Kolko's The Politics of War: The World and 
---
United States Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 was written from a 
perspective different from any of the other works studied on 
this topic. His position, simply stated, was that the 
United States were interested in preventing any large-scale 
penetration of Yugoslavia by either the Soviet Union or, in 
particular, by Great Britain. He wrote that the United 
States was incompetent and psychologiclly ill-prepared to 
deal with the left-leaning governments of Europe--Tito and 
Yugoslavia in particular. Kolko's research is based on 
familiar territory. He used State Department documents 
(Foreign Relations of the United States), Truman's 
Memoirs, Churchill's Closing the Ring and Triumph and 
Tragedy, Joseph Grew's Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record 
of Forty Years, 1904-1945, Volume !!_, and various Yugoslav 
sources, including Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Velebit. 
This author found that his research led him to far different 
conclusions and that Kolko contradicted himself in several 
respects. 
Kolko wrote: 
The consideration which entered State Department 
discussions more often than Russian domination or 
an undemocratic state after the war was the danger 
of the preeminent role of Britain in shaping 
Yugoslavia and South Balkan Affairs.9 
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This author cannot judge how Kolko came to this 
conclusion. The State Department papers spent a great deal 
of time dealing solely with the growing totalitarian state 
in Yugoslavia and how agreements made to insure the 
democratic freedoms for all of liberated Europe were being 
ignored at worst or simply being paid lip service in 
Yugoslavia. To be sure, the Americans did not fully agree 
with British policy in Yugoslavia and the Balkans because 
they judged this area to be of secondary importance and felt 
that it would lead to the use of war materials needed in 
more pressing areas. The State Department did follow 
Britain's activities here with interest, but was never 
greatly worried about British domination. 
Kolko described the British evacuation of Tito from the 
Yugoslav mainland to the Adriatic island of Vis as an 
attempt by the British to force political concessions on 
him. It can be argued that they tried to influence Tito, 
but found him a very hard man to coax. Kolko wrote that 
~ I 
Tito was forced to negotiate with Suba~ic, but in light of 
the eventual outcome of these negotiations, Tito could only 
be delighted. It was odd that Tito could be forced to deal 
with Suba~ic, but under far more promising circumstances on 
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the Italian mainland, the British were unable to start any 
negotiations at all between Tito and the Yugoslav King. 
The American policy of giving support to Mihailovit was 
described by Kolko as "absurd." He seemed to forget or 
v 
ignore the services provided by the Cetniks. Throughout 
v 
most of the war, the Cetniks rescued and returned downed 
American airmen at some considerable risk to themselves. 
Kolko wrote, "In practice, consistent opposition to the only 
plausible alternatives left in Yugoslavia, rather than 
10 
positive proposals, characterized American policy." 
Kolko, by his statement, seems to believe that Yugoslavia 
had no other option than to accept Tito and his Partisans as 
leaders of that country. It was obviously the eventual 
outcome, but was surely not the only alternative. In 
particular, the United States or Great Britain could have 
forced the King to return, or Yugoslavia could have been 
divided up into the separate republics of Serbia, Croatia, 
etc. 
In discussing Tito's relations with the Soviet Union, 
Kolko wrote: 
Tito went to Moscow because his relations with the 
Russians were also in disarray. • • • In reality, 
his relations with the Soviet Union had never been 
cordial, and nothing in the unequal character of 
Yugoslav Communism was intended to endear it to 
Moscow.11 
These contentions ring hollow to this author. First, Tito 
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had spent years in the Soviet Union and was, in fact, placed 
at the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party by the Russians. 
It must also be pointed out that Tito and the Yugoslav 
Communists did not take to the field against their country's 
occupiers until after the Soviet Union was invaded and 
Moscow put out a call for all Communists to come to the aid 
of the Soviet Union. It should also be pointed out that 
while in Moscow, Tito helped arrange for the smooth 
penetration of the Soviet forces into Yugoslavia and their 
handing over of liberated Yugoslav territory to Tito and his 
Partisans. Later in 1948, Tito would not go to Moscow 
because of his fear of the Russians, but in 1944, he felt no 
compulsion and went to ask for military aid, which was 
granted him. 
Kolko also wrote that the Soviets "instantly recognized 
Tito as a challenge to whatever position, passive or 
12 
dominant, they would define for themselves in the area." 
He also wrote that by 1944 the Soviets viewed Tito as a 
"major threat" and that the United States should have been 
able to anticipate the Yugoslav-Russian break of 1948. This 
author finds the above points very hard to understand: 
first, that Tito apparently viewed the British as no threat 
at all in the area, after the British had many times stated 
their intention of dominating Yugoslavia and the Balkans; 
and second, that the Soviet Union and Stalin believed that 
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they would have little problem in influencing Yugoslav 
politics to their ends. The Russians would learn of the 
fallacies of their arguments in 1948, but one could not 
expect the United States to be able to interpret events it 
knew little about when even the Russians, who were involved 
first-hand, could not properly anticipate Yugoslav-Russian 
political problems to come years later. 
In discussing the Tito-Subasid Agreement, Kolko once 
again drew strange conclusions. He stated that because of 
this Agreement "The United States lost its veto power over 
13 
Yugoslav politics • " This writer does not 
comprehend the meaning of this statement. Nowhere has he 
found where the United States held any "veto" over Yugoslav 
politics. Later on the same page, Kolko said that the 
Americans first supported Mihailovid and later switched 
their support to the King. Had Kolko forgotten that 
, 
Mihailovic was never independent of the King; that he had 
v 
led the Cetniks under his commission as an officer in the 
Royal Army; that Mihailovicworked for the return of the 
monarchy to Yugoslavia and was even a member of the King's 
/ 
war cabinet? Nowhere has this author found that Mihailovic 
was other than a servant to his King. 
Finally in this section, Kolko wrote of Tito: " 
But to the Americans he stood for foreign influences 
of the Left, and Washington never critically questioned the 
14 
nature of America's opposition to Yugoslav desires." This 
148 
author can agree that the Americans saw Tito as a foreign 
influence in Yugoslavia and that he was recognized as popular 
by a large segment of the Yugoslav populace, but the State 
Department devoted both time and effort to determining Tito's 
actual standing in Yugoslavia. The American Government 
became disillusioned by Tito because of his methods and 
ruthless consolidation of power. It was continually 
appalled at the lack of influence by pre-war politicians and 
at the subjugation of any political dissent in Yugoslavia. 
Most Americans at this time (Joseph Grew, an American 
diplomat included), looked upon Tito as a Russian puppet who 
did their bidding in the Balkans. Grew wrote "that Tito was 
not only proceeding to dominate the entire region which he 
admitted he intended to keep under the Peace Treaty, that 
15 
Russia was undoubtedly behind Tito's move •••• " 
On page 345, Kolko made the following statements: 
Yugoslavia represented the Eastern European future 
the Americans most feared, for here the Russians, 
British and Yugoslav Communists collaborated to 
exclude American influence altogether ••• However, 
a synthesis of Communism and nationalism was a 
subtle concept with no place in Washington's 
definition of the Left in Europe or anywhere else 
for that matter. 16 
Again Kolko contradicts himself. He continually stresses 
Tito and the Yugoslav Communists' independence of both 
Britain and the Soviet Union, but here he stated that they 
"collaborated." It seemed then, according to Kolko, that 
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Tito both worked with the Russians, apparently for mutual 
benefit, and he was also feared by the Russians for his 
independence. This author hates to be repetitive, but 
again, the Americans were not interested in Yugoslavia. 
Later, Kolko discussed the Tito-Subasic' Agreement, 
explaining how it was set up by the British to insure their 
position to oversee Yugoslav internal affairs. The British 
never did oversee Yugoslav affairs--again Kolko stretched the 
point. Finally, he explained how the Americans and British 
reacted to Yugoslavia in the Trieste-Venezia Giulia region. 
Kolko wrote that it was because of American influence 
that the British agreed to pressure to give the Allied 
Commander in the area the option of using force, but this 
was after much pressure from Britain, as pointed out in 
Foreign Relations of the United States and Grew's The 
Turbulent Era, both sources Kolko said he used and quoted in 
his book. 
Kolko used the same source material as this author, but 
seemed to give America a strong-willed policy to change the 
course of internal events in Yugoslavia. This author grants 
him that American was not happy about the eventual outcome 
in that country, but nowhere can he find concrete evidence 
of American pressure and a strong-willed policy for that 
country. Robert Murphy wrote in Diplomat Among Warriors, 
for example, that Roosevelt and America never had any firm 
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policy for Yugoslavia, and this was another source that 
Kolko cited. Kolko contradicted himself as this author 
points out above and seemed to read his source material 
differently than this author or a historian such as Herbert 
Feis. 
Parallel in time and research material with Kolko were 
the works of Herbert Feis: From Trust to Terror, The Onset 
of the Cold War, 1945-1952, Between War and Peace, The 
Potsdam Conference, and Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The 
War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. Kolko and Feis 
wrote extensively on the diplomatic history of World War II 
and the status quo in international relations following that 
war. However, their works do not say the same thing. Kolko 
takes a revisionist's view of these events and interprets 
them under an eye that was trained to judge from a far more 
questioning, or at least a less pro-Western, bias. On the 
other hand, Feis was a member of the State Department and 
wrote from the perspective of one who dealt with these 
issues and saw little reason to question the motives behind 
American policy. 
Although these men tend to disagree over most issues, 
they do agree on one not insubstantial issue: both found 
Tito to be independent and to work with the Soviet Union 
only inasmuch as it would benefit Yugoslavia. However, as 
this author has discussed above, Kolko contradicts himself 
17 
on his issue. Feis described Tito as "too independent" 
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as he summed up Stalin's view of this Balkan leader. He 
also wrote of him as a man who considered himself the equal 
of Stalin. 
Regardless of these two men's views, which this 
author believes to be colored with the knowledge of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet break of 1948, this author found little 
evidence to back Feis up. Murphy hinted at Tito's 
independence, but little concrete evidence was brought out 
during the period covered by this paper. 
Feis, on more than one occasion, described American 
hesitancy in dealing with Tito and Yugoslavia as being due 
to the unknown quality of Russian support. He understood 
that there was always the possibility of the State 
Department underestimating Tito's relationship with the 
Russians. In Chapter 6 of Between War and Peace, The 
Potsdam Conference, Feis discussed the problems of 
Yugoslavia's border claims, but he could never tear himself 
away from the fear of large Russian intervention on the side 
of Tito. It appeared that Tito, although an independent, 
still must have at least a measure of Russian support. The 
Foreign Relations of the United States cited many examples 
of American hesitancy and need for views of Russian thinking 
towards Yugoslavia. The diplomatic papers discussed and 
gave examples of American correspondence sent to the 
Russians. The United States requested Russian aid in 
152 
encouraging Tito to live up to the Yalta Declaration and 
even printed the Russian refusal and belief that regarding 
Yugoslavia the Yalta accords had been carried out. They 
also showed American requests for Russian assistance in 
dealing with Tito's moves into Austria and Trieste. The 
Foreign Relations of the United States published Russian 
requests for a Yugoslav zone of occupation in Austria, as 
well as other Russian replies which seemed to fully back 
Tito. 
When Feis wrote about the events in Trieste and Venezia 
Giulia, he described a much different situation than did 
Kolko. He also wrote at complete odds with Kolko concerning 
American attempts at changing the internal events in 
Yugoslavia. Feis wrote that the Americans were concerned 
with Great Britain, not because of their fear of British 
domination in Yugoslavia (as Kolko wrote), but because the 
United States wished to stay as far away from Yugoslav 
affairs as practical. Feis wrote that America wanted 
Central and Eastern Europe to remain free of spheres of 
influence and any tampering with internal affairs of these 
countries (Yugoslavia included). He wrote "that it 
[the American government] did not want to become involved at 
that time in decisions about frontiers or the internal 
18 
affairs of these countries." 
Feis also pointed out that he doubted even joint 
American-British military action in the Balkans could be 
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substantial enough to dissolve Russian power and influence, 
had they chosen such a route. He pointed out in both 
Between War and Peace, The Potsdam Conference and Churchill, 
Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They 
Sought that America was always worried about any lessening 
of American war efforts in other theaters of operation--that 
those war efforts would lessen if America were to strengthen 
efforts in the Balkans. He particularly pointed out how 
senior members of the American government and military were 
aginst war efforts in the Balkans, including General George 
s. Marshall, Admiral William Leahy, and President Truman. 
Feis wrote of the State Department's response to the 
Tito-~ubasicAgreement from a different angle than Kolko. 
He described British support for this agreement, not as a 
chance to increase their influence in Yugoslavia, but as an 
attempt to break up the dam in Yugoslav politics. He 
correctly described the State Department's response to the 
~ , 
Tito-Subasic Agreement. He wrote that the State Department 
recognized that this agreement would greatly favor one of 
the elements in Yugoslavia (Tito) and was judged to be a 
play at obtaining international recognition of Tito's 
emerging government in Yugoslavia. Other than pointing out 
its news on the matter to the British after they requested 
American support, the government did nothing. This is a 
significant departure from Kolko's description1 he viewed it 
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as a failure of the American government to recognize the 
status quo in Yugoslavia and as a step by the British to 
greatly enhance their prestige in Yugoslavia at the expense 
of a nervous America. Once again, in contrast to Kolko's 
claims, America did not act and stayed out of internal 
Yugoslav affairs. At Yalta, Feis described a joint 
communique from Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill as urging 
the Yugoslavs to implement this agreement. Hostility, it 
was felt, was never publicly announced by the Americans; 
they, in fact, urged, rather than rejected, the 
implementation of this agreement, according to Feis. 
Another area in which Feis and Kolko disagree is in the 
interpretation of American action vis-vis the Yugoslavs in 
Trieste and in Venezia Giulia. Here again, this writer 
agrees with Feis, as pointed out earlier; Kolko contradicted 
his own sources, while Feis wrote his narrative from 
basically identical evidence. Grew's Turbulent Era, a 
Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1944, Volume !.!. was a 
major source for Kolko's writing; Kolko wrote as though he 
were in agreement with Grew's work, but his conclusions 
actually were in disagreement with what Grew had said. This 
was particularly true in the area which dealt with the 
United States' reaction to Tito. That is, although the 
United States finally stood up to Tito, it was at the urging 
of Churchill and the British and not over their objections, 
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as Kolko said. The British were in constant contact with 
the Americans concerning Yugoslavia's thrust into this area. 
The Allied forces were under British command, and it was 
only after insistent British diplomatic pressure that 
America realized the situation and finally accepted the 
British view, which was full support for possible military 
action. 
In this author's research, much evidence was found to 
support the work of Feis, but little to support that of 
Kolko. Regardless of the similarity of source material, 
Kolko's views and beliefs can only be explained by his pro-
Soviet position. He wrote consistently of America's and 
Great Britain's anti-Yugoslav/Russian position. According 
to Kolko, the problems at the end of World War II were 
caused by Western capitalistic greed and intrasigency, while 
he depicted the Soviet Union as victimized and innocent • 
Three foreign books shed a somewhat different light on 
these issues as compared with the Feis or Kolko works. Roy 
Douglas, a British writer, said in From War to Cold War, 
1942-1948 that it was the British who were responsible for 
Tito's eventual success in Yugoslavia. He wrote that "The 
responsibility for Yugoslavia on a course towards communism 
rests with Churchill and his advisors, not with the 
19 
Russians." He described how the British led the way 
toward Tito's recognition and support by the Allies during 
the war. The second book, also written by a British author, 
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Mark c. Wheeler's Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940-
1943, agrees fully with Douglas' view. Wheeler wrote in 
many instances as if the United States did not exist when 
writing about relations with Yugoslavia. The third book, 
Yugoslavia in the Second World War, was written and 
published by three Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia. It can be 
legitimately assumed, although not absolutely verified, that 
this book, published in 1967 in Belgrade, conformed to the 
views of the Yugoslav government. 
~ I I 
The authors, Zarko Atanackovic, Ahmet Donlagic,, and 
~ ~ Dusan Plenca, argued that the American government was a 
hinderance to the new Yugoslavia " and continually raised 
problrns to thwart its establishment." They called the 
United States " ••• one of the greatest obstacles to the 
20 
international recognition of the new Yugoslavia." They 
also pointed out, as the other authors did, that it was 
Britain and not the United States which led in diplomatic 
dealings with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs wrote very 
favorably concerning the help they received from the Soviet 
Union during the war, although mentioning substantial 
assistance from the United States and Great Britain. They 
cited the Soviet Union for its moral assistance and greater 
understanding of the events in Yugoslavia. 
As the Americans looked to the problems of Trieste as 
an attempt by Yugoslavia to illegally claim territory that 
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did not belong to it, the Yugoslavs viewed the Americans and 
the British as provoacateurs who had no right or need to 
interfere in this situation. They also wrote that the Tito-
" ., I' Subasic Agreement " • was a major political victory for 
21 
the new Yugoslavia." This is not surprising because it 
allowed the present Yugoslav government to evolve and 
eventually to formalize the "new Yugoslavia." 
In this context of the Tito-~ubasicAgreement, the 
United States was ignored. This last book was written in a 
tone that contradicts both Feis and Kolko on Yugoslavia's 
relations with the Soviet Union. The authors wrote from the 
perspective that relations with the Russians were close and 
that no substantial problems arose between the two countries 
during the war. 
Vojtech Mastny's Russia's Road to the Cold War 
Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-
1945, was published in 1979, years after any of the 
previously-mentioned studies. He wrote after substantially 
all the Western diplomatic sources had been made public and, 
by his own admission, in response to what he called the 
"fallacies of the revisionist historians." He wrote only 
indirectly about Yugoslav-American relations, but does 
discuss Yugoslav-Russian relations during the war. 
He wrote much about how Yugoslav Communist actions 
disturbed Stalin and his plans for the war. Stalin saw Tito 
as too independent and perhaps dangerous in maintaining 
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close and profitable relations with the Western Allies. He 
returned to this premise on other occasions. Mastny wrote 
that Stalin was flabbergasted at the Jajce Declaration and 
only acquiesed when no protests were forthcoming from the 
West. In these remarks, Mastny closely parallels Kolko's 
projection of Yugoslavia as a thorn in the Russian's side, 
but he was in disagreement with Kolko in other areas of 
Yugoslav-Russian relations. 
Whereas Kolko wrote that Tito acted almost totally 
independently of the Soviet Union on the matter of Venezia 
Giulia, Mastny wrote that Churchill received a message from 
Stalin that gratuitously aggravated the situation in support 
of the Yugoslavs. Mastny also wrote, in complete 
contradiction to Kolko, that Moscow was drawn into Balkan 
affairs by "Communist action and Western inaction." 
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APPENDIX 
TEXT OF THE TITO-SUBASIC AGREEMENT 
Agreement 
between the President of the National Committee of 
Liberation of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime 
Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic. 
In compliance with the principle of the continuity of 
the Yugoslav State from the point of view of international 
law·, and the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations, 
demonstrated by their four year's struggle for a new, 
independent and federal State, built up on the principles of 
democracy, we desire and make every effort for the people's 
will to be respected at every step and by everybody, both 
with regard to the internal organization of the State and to 
the form of government, and therefore intend to comply with 
the fundamental and general principles of constitutional 
government proper to all truly democratic States. 
Yugoslavia being acknowledged among the United Nations 
in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall 
continue to represent our country abroad and in all acts 
pertaining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time 
178 
when our State, the democratic, federative Yugoslavia of the 
future, assumes, by a free decision of the people, the 
definite form of its government. 
In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in 
the country, we have agreed that King Peter II shall not 
return to the country until the people have promounced their 
decision in this respect, and that in his absence the Royal 
Power should be wielded by a Regency Council. 
The Regency Council will be appointed by a 
constitutional act of the King, on the proposal of the Royal 
Government, and in agreement with the President of the 
National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. 
B. Tito, and the President of the Royal Government, Dr. Ivan 
Subasic. The Regenqy Council take their oath to the King, 
while the Government take their oath to to people. 
The President of the National Committee of Liberation 
of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the President of 
the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Subasic, with the full 
concurrence of the Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation of 




3. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
4. Minister of the Interior 
5. Minister of National Defense 
6. Minister of Justice 
7. Minister of Education 
8. Minister of Finance 
9. Minister of Trade and Industry 
10. Minister of Communications 
11. Minister of Post, Telegraphs and Telephone 
12. Minister of Forests 
13. Minister of Mines 
14. Minister of Agriculture 
15. Minister of Social Welfare 
16. Minister of National Health 
17. Minister of Public Works 
18. Minister of Reconstruction 
19. Minister of Food 
20. Minister of Information 
21. Minister for Colonization 
22. Minister for the Constituent Assembly 
23. Minister of State for Serbia 
24. Minister of State for Croatia 
25. Minister of State for Slovenia 
26. Minister of State for Montenegro 
27. Minister of State for Macedonia 
28. Minister of State for Bosnia-Hercegovina 
This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in 
force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i.e., 
until the final constitutional organization of the State will 
be established. 
The new government will publish a declaration 
proclaiming the fundamental principles of the democratic 
liberties and guaranteeing their application. Personal 
freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of 
conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom 
of assembly and association will be specifically emphasized 
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and guaranteed7 and, in the same way, the right or property 
and private initiative. The sovereignty of the national 
individualities within the State and their equal rights will 
be respected and safeguarded, as decided at the Second 
Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation 
of Yugoslavia. Any predominance of one nation over another 
will be excluded. 
November 1, 1944 
The President of the Royal 
Yugoslav Government 
Dr. Ivan Subasic 
The President of the National 
Committee of the Liberation 
of Yugoslavia 
J. B. Tito 
